3 ideas
| 2118 | All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Although people can be made worse off by all other gifts, correct reasoning alone can only be for the good. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Preface to Universal Characteristic [1679]) | |
| A reaction: How about a kind heart? Not everyone would agree with the remark, but philosophers should. |
| 19708 | Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid] |
| Full Idea: In Foley's subjective internalist account it is egocentrically rational for an agent to believe a proposition only if he would think on deep reflection that believing it is conducive to having an accurate and comprehensive belief system. | |
| From: report of Richard Foley (The Theory of Epistemic Rationality [1987], 2.1 B) by Hamid Vahid - Externalism/Internalism | |
| A reaction: I like this idea, because it indicates the link between internalism and coherence about justification. I don't think you can be an externalist coherence theorist for justification. [Reminder: Paul Thagard is the best writer on coherence]. |
| 4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Williams has expressed pessimism about the project of Aristotelian naturalism on the grounds that his conception of nature, and thereby of human nature, was normative, and that, in a scientific age, this is not a conception that we can take on board. | |
| From: report of Bernard Williams (works [1971]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.11 | |
| A reaction: I think there is a compromise here. The existentialist denial of intrinsic human nature seems daft, but Aristotelians must grasp the enormous flexibility that is possible to human behaviour because of the open nature of rationality. |