|
16629
|
By comparing qualities and features, reason can gradually infer the nature of substance [Grosseteste]
|
|
Full Idea:
Awakened reason distinguishes color from size and shape from body and then shape and size from the substance of body, and so by drawing distinctions and abstracting, it arrives at a grasp of the substance of body, which supports size, shape and color.
|
|
From:
Robert Grosseteste (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics' [1226], I.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.4
|
|
A reaction:
This optimistic view influenced Aquinas, and is called 'incrementalism' by Pasnau. It is the spirit of scientific essentialism, and a nice instance of inference to the best explanation (though 'substance' in itself explains virtually nothing).
|
|
3238
|
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
|
|
From:
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
|
|
A reaction:
A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.
|
|
3239
|
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
|
|
From:
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
|
|
A reaction:
Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?
|