4 ideas
| 527 | Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios] |
| Full Idea: Everything exists which anyone perceives. | |
| From: Metrodorus (Chi) (Natural Science (lost) [c.340 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
| A reaction: cf Berkeley and Epicurus. This misses out the problem of perceptual error, such as a square tower looking round from a distance, or one person in a group thinking they have seen something. It is still a good criterion, though! |
| 22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: Logic and observation alone do not force a scientist to reject a scientific claim if experimental observations so not turn out as expected. The scientist must reject something of the initial set of claims, but that is a matter of choice. | |
| From: report of Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 2 | |
| A reaction: This is a key point against any simplified Popperian notion of falsification. Tiny observations can't kill huge well supported theories. |
| 18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
| Full Idea: The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions ...it does not designate which one should be changed. | |
| From: Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906], p.187), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the idea frequently invoked by Quine, in support of his holistic view of scientific knowledge (along with Neurath's Boat). |
| 4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Williams has expressed pessimism about the project of Aristotelian naturalism on the grounds that his conception of nature, and thereby of human nature, was normative, and that, in a scientific age, this is not a conception that we can take on board. | |
| From: report of Bernard Williams (works [1971]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.11 | |
| A reaction: I think there is a compromise here. The existentialist denial of intrinsic human nature seems daft, but Aristotelians must grasp the enormous flexibility that is possible to human behaviour because of the open nature of rationality. |