3238
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'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
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From:
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
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A reaction:
A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.
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3239
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You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
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From:
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
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A reaction:
Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?
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21991
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The middle class gain freedom through property, but workers can only free all of humanity [Marx, by Singer]
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Full Idea:
Where the middle class can win freedom for themselves on the basis of rights to property - thus excluding others from their freedom - the working class have nothing but their title as human beings. They only liberate themselves by liberating humanity.
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From:
report of Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844]) by Peter Singer - Marx 4
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A reaction:
Individual workers might gain freedom via education, marriage, or entrepreneurship, or by opting for total simplicity of life, but in general Marx seems to be right about this. But we must ask what sort of 'freedom' is needed.
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