Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are Persons Bodies?', 'Ways Worlds Could Be' and 'God in Plato'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil]
     Full Idea: In Greece, Aristotle is perhaps the only philosopher in the modern sense, and he is entirely outside the Greek tradition.
     From: Simone Weil (God in Plato [1942], p.45)
     A reaction: She sees Plato as embodying the true tradition. Everything Aristotle writes is 'peri phusis' (about nature), and that is a standard topic of philosophy right from the start. She emphasises Plato long historical roots. Pythagoras is key.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds.
     From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro'
     A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions?
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
     From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
     A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
     From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
     A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil]
     Full Idea: The only legitimate proof [of God's existence] from the order of the world is the proof from the beauty of the world.
     From: Simone Weil (God in Plato [1942], p.89)
     A reaction: She finds this proof in Plato. Hume's critique never (I think) mentions beauty, although in the 18thC love of the sublime could play that role. For me, the human experience of beauty doesn't have such cosmic significance.