5 ideas
| 15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds. | |
| From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions? |
| 21687 | It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine] |
| Full Idea: It is not to be wondered that theory makers seek simplicity. When two theories are equally defensible on other counts, certainly the simpler of the two is to be preferred on the score of both beauty and convenience. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On Simple Theories of a Complex World [1960], p.255) | |
| A reaction: A simple application of Ockham's Razor. Quine goes on to nicely deconstruct what is involved in simplicity, and identify a certain amount of dubious prejudice in the concept. |
| 21688 | There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We prefer simpler theories through wishful thinking, or a bias which slants the data, or a bias where the simpler hypothesis is more open to confirmation, or simpler hypotheses tolerating wider deviations in score-keeping. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On Simple Theories of a Complex World [1960], p.258) | |
| A reaction: [a compression of his summary of the paper] Quine is not dismissing our preference for simpler theories, but just very nicely inviting us to focus of aspects about which we should be cautious. |
| 3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74) | |
| A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality. |
| 3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81) | |
| A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love? |