5 ideas
14961 | Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: There is at the moment a pipe on my desk. Its stem has been removed but it remains a pipe for all that; otherwise no pipe could survive a thorough cleaning. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.175) | |
A reaction: To say that the pipe survives dismantling is not to say that it is fully a pipe during its dismantled phase. He gives a further example of a book in two volumes. |
14962 | Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: If a branch falls from a tree, the tree does not thereby become scattered, and a human body does not become scattered upon loss of a bit of fingernail. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.184) | |
A reaction: This sort of observation draws me towards essentialism. A body is scattered if you divide it in a major way, but not if you separate off a minor part. It isn't just a matter of size, or even function. We have broader idea of what is essential. |
3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74) | |
A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality. |
3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81) | |
A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love? |
22395 | Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot] |
Full Idea: Moral judgements are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they give reasons for acting only in conjunction with interests and desires. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Reply to Professor Frankena [1975], p.177) | |
A reaction: This is a splendid claim, which points to a more sensibly naturalistic ethics. There seem to be occasions for moral behaviour where I have no interests or desires, such as when a stranger asks me for a favour and I'm feeling tired. |