19 ideas
13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian method of working form aporia allows one to use as starting points not only what is said by 'the many', but also what is said by 'the wise', including philosophers. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1 n2) | |
A reaction: [She mentions Nussbaum 1986:ch 7 for the opposing view] I like this thought a lot. Aristotle's democratic respect for widespread views can be a bit puzzling sometimes. |
12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the famous Hilbert Programme, which is said to have been brought to an abrupt end by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. |
12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The thesis that every mathematical problem is solvable - we are all convinced that it really is so. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.200) | |
A reaction: This will include, for example, Goldbach's Conjecture (every even is the sum of two primes), which is utterly simple but with no proof anywhere in sight. |
9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.191), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is Hilbert's famous refusal to accept any account of mathematics, such as Kant's, which excludes actual infinities. Cantor had laid out a whole glorious hierarchy of different infinities. |
12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: To preserve the simple formal rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic, we must supplement the finitary statements with ideal statements. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.195) | |
A reaction: I find very appealing the picture of mathematics as rooted in the physical world, and then gradually extended by a series of 'idealisations', which should perhaps be thought of as fictions. |
12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: Operating with the infinite can be made certain only by the finitary. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.201) | |
A reaction: See 'Compactness' for one aspect of this claim. I think Hilbert was fighting a rearguard action, and his idea now has few followers. |
12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: Just as in the limit processes of the infinitesimal calculus, the infinitely large and small proved to be a mere figure of speech, so too we must realise that the infinite in the sense of an infinite totality, used in deductive methods, is an illusion. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
A reaction: This is a very authoritative rearguard action. I no longer think the dispute matters much, it being just a dispute over a proposed new meaning for the word 'number'. |
12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: A homogeneous continuum which admits of the sort of divisibility needed to realise the infinitely small is nowhere to be found in reality. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.186) | |
A reaction: He makes this remark as a response to Planck's new quantum theory (the year before the big works of Heisenberg and Schrödinger). Personally I don't see why infinities should depend on the physical world, since they are imaginary. |
12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The subject matter of mathematics is the concrete symbols themselves whose structure is immediately clear and recognisable. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.192) | |
A reaction: I don't think many people will agree with Hilbert here. Does he mean token-symbols or type-symbols? You can do maths in your head, or with different symbols. If type-symbols, you have to explain what a type is. |
18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: We can conceive mathematics to be a stock of two kinds of formulas: first, those to which the meaningful communications of finitary statements correspond; and secondly, other formulas which signify nothing and which are ideal structures of our theory. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.196), quoted by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 |
13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: Disputes over ontology derive from more fundamental disputes over forms of explanation. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1) | |
A reaction: It immediately strikes me that Haslanger has stolen my master idea, but unfortunately the dating suggests that she has priority. The tricky part is to combine this view with realism. |
13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: The notion that things persist through change is deeply embedded in ideas we have about explanation, and in particular, in the idea that the present is constrained by the past. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1) | |
A reaction: I take this to be both an important and an attractive idea. Deniers of persistence (4D-ists) will presumably have some ability to explain the present, but it is the idea of the present being 'constrained' by the past which is a challenge. |
13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: Persistence offers intelligibility: the possibility of understanding a change, and of understanding the products of it. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 8) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right, and it is a powerful idea with wide implications for metaphysics. Haslanger claims that an understanding of 'substance' is needed, which leads towards my defence of essentialism. |
13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: If the world of time-slices is to be explicable, then it must be possible to provide explanations of change understood as a continual generation and destruction of these 'momentary entities'. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7) | |
A reaction: While fans of time-slices can offer some sort of explanation, in the process of explaining a 'worm', there don't seem to be the sort of causal chains that we traditionally rely on. Maybe there are no explanations of anything? |
13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: How is the case in which A exists prior to B, but is distinct from B, different (especially from B's point of view) from the case in which nothing exists prior to B? | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7) | |
A reaction: I sympathise with her view, but this isn't persuasive. For A substitute 'Sally's mother' and for B substitute 'Sally'. A 4D-ist could bite the bullet and say that, indeed, previous parts of my 'worm' need not have existed. |
9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This dream is famous for being shattered by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem a mere six years later. Neverless there seem to be more limited certainties which are accepted in mathematics. The certainty of the whole of arithmetic is beyond us. |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: Natural explanations work by showing the systematic causal interconnections between things. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7) | |
A reaction: On the whole I love this sort of idea, but I am wondering if this one prevents mathematical or logical explanations from being natural. |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: I am not resting my ontology on a simple 'argument to the best explanation'. ..What I want to say is that there are general demands on a kind of explanation, in particular, natural explanation, which require that there are persisting things. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 5) | |
A reaction: This is a really nice idea - that best explanation is not just about specific cases, but also about best foundations for explanations in general, which brings in our metaphysics. I defend the role of essences in these best explanations. |
4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Williams has expressed pessimism about the project of Aristotelian naturalism on the grounds that his conception of nature, and thereby of human nature, was normative, and that, in a scientific age, this is not a conception that we can take on board. | |
From: report of Bernard Williams (works [1971]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.11 | |
A reaction: I think there is a compromise here. The existentialist denial of intrinsic human nature seems daft, but Aristotelians must grasp the enormous flexibility that is possible to human behaviour because of the open nature of rationality. |