14 ideas
| 7848 | Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| Full Idea: For Nietzsche philosophy begins in horror - existence is something both horrible and absurd. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Birth of Tragedy [1871]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - How to Read Nietzsche Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: A striking contrast to Aristotle (Idea 549). Personally I think my philosophy begins with confusion. Not that I endorse a Wittgenteinian view, that we are just trying to cure ourselves of self-inflicted wounds. Life is very complex and we are bit simple. |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
| A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello). |
| 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
| 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
| A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
| 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
| A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
| 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
| 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
| 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
| 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
| 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
| 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |