83 ideas
6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the business of metaphysics is to describe the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III) | |
A reaction: At least he believed in metaphysics. Presumably he intends to describe the world in terms of its categories, rather than cataloguing every blade of grass. |
6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
Full Idea: You diminish the risk of error with every diminution of entities and premisses. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII) | |
A reaction: If there are actually lots of entities, you would increase error if you reduced them too much. Ockham's Razor seems more to do with the limited capacity of the human mind than with the simplicity or complexity of reality. See Idea 4456. |
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
Full Idea: A fact is the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false, …and it is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like 'Socrates'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: It is important to note a point here which I consider vital - that Russell keeps the idea of a fact quite distinct from the language in which it is expressed. Facts are a 'sort of thing', of the kind which are now referred to as 'truth-makers'. |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell held that beside atomic truths, also general and negative truths have truth-makers. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Adolph Rami - Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making note 04 |
13634 | Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In a sense, satisfaction is the notion of 'truth in a model', and (as Hodes 1984 elegantly puts it) 'truth in a model' is a model of 'truth'. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: So we can say that Tarski doesn't offer a definition of truth itself, but replaces it with a 'model' of truth. |
13643 | Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian logic is complete. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Corcoran 1972] |
13651 | A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: If, for every b∈d, a∈b entails that a∈d, the d is said to be 'transitive'. In other words, d is transitive if it contains every member of each of its members. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 4.2) | |
A reaction: The alternative would be that the members of the set are subsets, but the members of those subsets are not themselves members of the higher-level set. |
6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
Full Idea: With the ordinary view of classes you would say that a class that has only one member was the same as that one member; that will land you in terrible difficulties, because in that case that one member is a member of that class, namely, itself. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VII) | |
A reaction: The problem (I think) is that classes (sets) were defined by Frege as being identical with their members (their extension). With hindsight this may have been a mistake. The question is always 'why is that particular a member of that set?' |
13647 | Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The axiom of choice is essential for proving the downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 4.1) |
13631 | Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Is there a notion of set in the jurisdiction of logic, or does it belong to mathematics proper? | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: It immediately strikes me that they might be neither. I don't see that relations between well-defined groups of things must involve number, and I don't see that mapping the relations must intrinsically involve logical consequence or inference. |
13654 | It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In set theory it is central to the iterative conception that the membership relation is well-founded, ...which means there are no infinite descending chains from any relation. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 5.1.4) |
13640 | Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The argument behind Russell's paradox shows that in set theory there are logical sets (i.e. classes) that are not iterative sets. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.3) | |
A reaction: In his preface, Shapiro expresses doubts about the idea of a 'logical set'. Hence the theorists like the iterative hierarchy because it is well-founded and under control, not because it is comprehensive in scope. See all of pp.19-20. |
13666 | Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Iterative sets do not exhibit a Boolean structure, because the complement of an iterative set is not itself an iterative set. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.1) |
13653 | 'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A 'well-ordering' of a set X is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation on X in which every non-empty subset of X has a least element. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 5.1.3) | |
A reaction: So there is a beginning, an ongoing sequence, and no retracing of steps. |
13627 | There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: There is no question of finding the 'correct' or 'true' logic underlying a part of natural language. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: One needs the context of Shapiro's defence of second-order logic to see his reasons for this. Call me romantic, but I retain faith that there is one true logic. The Kennedy Assassination problem - can't see the truth because drowning in evidence. |
13642 | Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A logic can be seen as the ideal of what may be called 'relative justification', the process of coming to know some propositions on the basis of others. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 2.3.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the modern idea of logic, as opposed to identification of a set of 'logical truths' from which eternal necessities (such as mathematics) can be derived. 'Know' implies that they are true - which conclusions may not be. |
13668 | Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic, the first precise solution as part of the Hilbert programme. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.2.1) |
13669 | Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In 1910 Weyl observed that set theory seemed to presuppose natural numbers, and he regarded numbers as more fundamental than sets, as did Fraenkel. Dedekind had developed set theory independently, and used it to formulate numbers. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.2.2) |
13667 | Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Skolem and Gödel were the main proponents of first-order languages. The higher-order language 'opposition' was championed by Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.2) |
13662 | First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Almost all the systems developed in the first part of the twentieth century are higher-order; first-order logic was an afterthought. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.1) |
13624 | The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to the remnants of failed foundationalist programmes early this century - logicism and the Hilbert programme. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: Being complete must also be one of its attractions, and Quine seems to like it because of its minimal ontological commitment. |
13660 | Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Tharp (1975) suggested that compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are consequences of features one would want a logic to have. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 6.5) | |
A reaction: I like this proposal, though Shapiro is strongly against. We keep extending our logic so that we can prove new things, but why should we assume that we can prove everything? That's just what Gödel suggests that we should give up on. |
13673 | The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The notion of finitude is explicitly 'built in' to the systems of first-order languages in one way or another. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think that they are none the worse for that. No one had even thought of all these lovely infinities before 1870, and now we are supposed to change our logic (our actual logic!) to accommodate them. Cf quantum logic. |
15944 | Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Shapiro preferred second-order logic to set theory because second-order logic refers only to the relations and operations in a domain, and not to the other things that set-theory brings with it - other domains, higher-order relations, and so forth. | |
From: report of Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VII.4 |
13629 | Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Three systems of semantics for second-order languages: 'standard semantics' (variables cover all relations and functions), 'Henkin semantics' (relations and functions are a subclass) and 'first-order semantics' (many-sorted domains for variable-types). | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: [my summary] |
13650 | Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro] |
Full Idea:
In 'Henkin' semantics, in a given model |
|
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 3.3) |
13645 | In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In the standard semantics of second-order logic, by fixing a domain one thereby fixes the range of both the first-order variables and the second-order variables. There is no further 'interpreting' to be done. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with 'Henkin' semantics (Idea 13650), or first-order semantics, which involve more than one domain of quantification. |
13649 | Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The counterparts of Completeness, Compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems all fail for second-order languages with standard semantics, but hold for Henkin or first-order semantics. Hence such logics are much like first-order logic. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Shapiro votes for the standard semantics, because he wants the greater expressive power, especially for the characterization of infinite structures. |
13626 | Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: It follows from Gödel's incompleteness theorem that the semantic consequence relation of second-order logic is not effective. For example, the set of logical truths of any second-order logic is not recursively enumerable. It is not even arithmetic. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: I don't fully understand this, but it sounds rather major, and a good reason to avoid second-order logic (despite Shapiro's proselytising). See Peter Smith on 'effectively enumerable'. |
13637 | If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic is inherently incomplete, so its semantic consequence relation is not effective. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.2.1) |
13632 | Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes difficult to find a formula that is a suitable counterpart of a particular sentence of natural language, and there is no acclaimed criterion for what counts as a good, or even acceptable, 'translation'. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.1) |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §II) | |
A reaction: In other words, there would be no universals, only names? All that matters is that a language can successfully refer (unambiguously) to anything it wishes to. There must be better ways than Russell's lexical explosion. |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
Full Idea: Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: A very nice paradoxical assertion, which captures the problem of finding the logical form for negative existential statements. Presumably the proposition refers to the mythical founder of Rome, though. He is not, I suppose, rigidly designated. |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
Full Idea: If you understand English you would understand the phrase 'the author of Waverley' if you had not heard it before, whereas you would not understand the meaning of 'Scott', because to know the meaning of a name is to know who it is applied to. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: Actually, you would find 'Waverley' a bit baffling too. Would you understand "he was the author of his own destruction"? You can understand "Homer was the author of this" without knowing quite who 'Homer' applies to. All very tricky. |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: A logically proper name must be semantically simple, have just one referent, be understood by the user, be scopeless, is not a definite description, and rigidly designates. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 24th pg) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference Intro | |
A reaction: Famously, Russell's hopes of achieving this logically desirable end got narrower and narrower, and ended with 'this' or 'that'. Maybe pure language can't do the job. |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
Full Idea: Having proposed that descriptions should be treated in quantificational terms, Russell then went on to introduce the subsidiary injunction that proper names should be treated as descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.18 | |
A reaction: McCulloch says Russell 'has a lot to answer for' here. It became a hot topic with Kripke. Personally I find Lewis's notion of counterparts the most promising line of enquiry. |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
Full Idea: A name has got to name something or it is not a name. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 66th pg), quoted by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be stipulative, since most people would say that a list of potential names for a baby counted as names. It may be wrong. There are fictional names, or mistakes. |
13674 | We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The main role of substitutional semantics is to reduce ontology. As an alternative to model-theoretic semantics for formal languages, the idea is to replace the 'satisfaction' relation of formulas (by objects) with the 'truth' of sentences (using terms). | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.1.4) | |
A reaction: I find this very appealing, and Ruth Barcan Marcus is the person to look at. My intuition is that logic should have no ontology at all, as it is just about how inference works, not about how things are. Shapiro offers a compromise. |
13633 | 'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The 'satisfaction' relation may be thought of as a function from models, assignments, and formulas to the truth values {true,false}. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This at least makes clear that satisfaction is not the same as truth. Now you have to understand how Tarski can define truth in terms of satisfaction. |
13644 | Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Typically, model-theoretic semantics is formulated in set theory. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 2.5.1) |
13636 | An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: An axiomatization is 'categorical' if all its models are isomorphic to one another; ..hence it has 'essentially only one' interpretation [Veblen 1904]. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.2.1) |
13670 | Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Categoricity cannot be attained in a first-order language. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.3) |
13658 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A language has the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem property if each satisfiable countable set of sentences has a model whose domain is at most countable. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 6.5) | |
A reaction: This means you can't employ an infinite model to represent a fact about a countable set. |
13659 | Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A language has the Upward Löwenheim-Skolem property if for each set of sentences whose model has an infinite domain, then it has a model at least as big as each infinite cardinal. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 6.5) | |
A reaction: This means you can't have a countable model to represent a fact about infinite sets. |
13648 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems mean that no first-order theory with an infinite model is categorical. If Γ has an infinite model, then it has a model of every infinite cardinality. So first-order languages cannot characterize infinite structures. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 4.1) | |
A reaction: So much of the debate about different logics hinges on characterizing 'infinite structures' - whatever they are! Shapiro is a leading structuralist in mathematics, so he wants second-order logic to help with his project. |
13675 | Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The Upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem fails (trivially) with substitutional semantics. If there are only countably many terms of the language, then there are no uncountable substitution models. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.1.4) | |
A reaction: Better and better. See Idea 13674. Why postulate more objects than you can possibly name? I'm even suspicious of all real numbers, because you can't properly define them in finite terms. Shapiro objects that the uncountable can't be characterized. |
13635 | 'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A logic is 'weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth, and 'strongly sound', or simply 'sound', if every deduction from Γ is a semantic consequence of Γ. Soundness indicates that the deductive system is faithful to the semantics. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Similarly, 'weakly complete' is when every logical truth is a theorem. |
13628 | We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: We can live without completeness in logic, and live well. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of heady suggestion that American philosophers love to make. Sounds OK to me, though. Our ability to draw good inferences should be expected to outrun our ability to actually prove them. Completeness is for wimps. |
13630 | Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that non-compactness is a defect of second-order logic, but it is a consequence of a crucial strength - its ability to give categorical characterisations of infinite structures. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: The dispute between fans of first- and second-order may hinge on their attitude to the infinite. I note that Skolem, who was not keen on the infinite, stuck to first-order. Should we launch a new Skolemite Crusade? |
13646 | Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Compactness is a corollary of soundness and completeness. If Γ is not satisfiable, then, by completeness, Γ is not consistent. But the deductions contain only finite premises. So a finite subset shows the inconsistency. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [this is abbreviated, but a proof of compactness] Since all worthwhile logics are sound, this effectively means that completeness entails compactness. |
13661 | A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A logical language is 'semantically effective' if the collection of logically true sentences is a recursively enumerable set of strings. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 6.5) |
13641 | Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: 'Definitions' of integers as pairs of naturals, rationals as pairs of integers, reals as Cauchy sequences of rationals, and complex numbers as pairs of reals are reductive foundations of various fields. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 2.1) | |
A reaction: On p.30 (bottom) Shapiro objects that in the process of reduction the numbers acquire properties they didn't have before. |
13676 | Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The main problem of characterizing the natural numbers is to state, somehow, that 0,1,2,.... are all the numbers that there are. We have seen that this can be accomplished with a higher-order language, but not in a first-order language. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.1.4) |
13677 | Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: By convention, the natural numbers are the finite ordinals, the integers are certain equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals, etc. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.3) |
13652 | The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 5.1.2) |
13657 | First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Few theorists consider first-order arithmetic to be an adequate representation of even basic number theory. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 5 n28) | |
A reaction: This will be because of Idea 13656. Even 'basic' number theory will include all sorts of vast infinities, and that seems to be where the trouble is. |
13656 | Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: There are sets of natural numbers definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 5.3.3) |
13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: It is claimed that aiming at a universal language for all contexts, and the thesis that logic does not involve a process of abstraction, separates the logicists from algebraists and mathematicians, and also from modern model theory. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.1) | |
A reaction: I am intuitively drawn to the idea that logic is essentially the result of a series of abstractions, so this gives me a further reason not to be a logicist. Shapiro cites Goldfarb 1979 and van Heijenoort 1967. Logicists reduce abstraction to logic. |
13625 | Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: I extend Quinean holism to logic itself; there is no sharp border between mathematics and logic, especially the logic of mathematics. One cannot expect to do logic without incorporating some mathematics and accepting at least some of its ontology. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], Pref) | |
A reaction: I have strong sales resistance to this proposal. Mathematics may have hijacked logic and warped it for its own evil purposes, but if logic is just the study of inferences then it must be more general than to apply specifically to mathematics. |
6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers are classes of classes, and classes are logical fictions, so that numbers are, as it were, fictions at two removes, fictions of fictions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII) | |
A reaction: This summarises the findings of Russell and Whitehead's researches into logicism. Gödel may have proved that project impossible, but there is now debate about that. Personally I think of numbers as names of patterns. |
13663 | Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Some authors (Poincaré and Russell, for example) were disposed to reject properties that are not definable, or are definable only impredicatively. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 7.1) | |
A reaction: I take Quine to be the culmination of this line of thought, with his general rejection of 'attributes' in logic and in metaphysics. |
21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Russell's new logical atomist ontology was of particulars, universals and facts, replacing the ontology of 'platonic atomism' consisting just of propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
A reaction: Linsky cites Peter Hylton as saying that the earlier view was never replaced. The earlier view required propositions to be 'unified'. I surmise that the formula 'Fa' combines a universal and a particular, to form an atomic fact. [...but Idea 6111!] |
19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell does not admit facts as fundamental; atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not atomic facts but sense data. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.83 | |
A reaction: By about 1921 Russell had totally given up sense-data, because he had been reading behaviourist psychology. |
6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
Full Idea: I call my doctrine logical atomism because, as the last residue of analysis, I wish to arrive at logical atoms and not physical atoms; some of them will be particulars, and others will be predicates and relations and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: However we judge it, logical atomism is a vital landmark in the history of 'analytical' philosophy, because it lays out the ideal for our assessment. It is fashionable to denigrate analysis, but I think it is simply the nearest to wisdom we will ever get. |
6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you have enumerated all the atomic facts in the world, it is a further fact about the world that those are all the atomic facts there are about the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §V) | |
A reaction: There is obviously a potential regress of facts about facts here. This looks like one of the reasons why the original logical atomism had a short shelf-life. Personally I see this as an argument in favour of rationalism, in the way Bonjour argues for it. |
6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logical atomism is the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII) | |
A reaction: This dream is to empiricists what the Absolute is to rationalists - a bit silly, but an embodiment of the motivating dream. |
21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
Full Idea: Facts are the sort of things that are asserted or denied by propositions, and are not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are. That is shown by the fact that you cannot name them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], p.235), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.2 | |
A reaction: [ref to Papers vol.8] It is customary to specify a proposition by its capacity for T and F. So is a fact just 'a truth'? This contains the Fregean idea that things are only real if they can be picked out. I think of facts as independent of minds. |
18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Russell argues for atomic facts, and also for existential facts, negative facts and general facts. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 05.1 | |
A reaction: Armstrong says he overdoes it. I would even add disjunctive facts, which Russell rejects. 'Rain or snow will ruin the cricket match'. Rain can make that true, but it is a disjunctive fact about the match. |
5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: Russell and Wittgenstein sought to reduce everything to singular facts or states of affairs, and Armstrong and Keith Campbell have more recently advocated ontologies of tropes or elementary states of affairs. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 n 11 | |
A reaction: A very interesting historical link. Logical atomism strikes me as a key landmark in the history of philosophy, and not an eccentric cul-de-sac. It is always worth trying to get your ontology down to minimal small units, to see what happens. |
6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of 'existence'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]), quoted by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Functions depend on variables, so this leads to Quine's slogan "to be is to be the value of a variable". Assertions of non-existence are an obvious problem, but Russell thought of all that. All of this makes existence too dependent on language. |
13638 | Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Properties are often taken to be intensional; equiangular and equilateral are thought to be different properties of triangles, even though any triangle is equilateral if and only if it is equiangular. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Many logicians seem to want to treat properties as sets of objects (red being just the set of red things), but this looks like a desperate desire to say everything in first-order logic, where only objects are available to quantify over. |
6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Traditional philosophy discusses 'necessary', 'possible' and 'impossible' as properties of propositions, whereas in fact they are properties of propositional functions; propositions are only true or false. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §V) | |
A reaction: I am unclear how a truth could be known to be necessary if it is full of variables. 'x is human' seems to have no modality, but 'Socrates is human' could well be necessary. I like McGinn's rather adverbial account of modality. |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that perception, as opposed to belief, does go straight to the fact and not through the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a question of an intermediate stage, which is the formulation of concepts. Is full 'perception' (backed by attention and intellect) laden with concepts, which point to facts? Where are the facts in sensation without recognition? |
6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to deal with the theory of error without assuming the existence of the non-existent. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.3) | |
A reaction: This problem really bothered Russell (and Plato). I suspect that it was a self-inflicted problem because at this point Russell had ceased to believe in propositions. If we accept propositions as intentional objects, they can be as silly as you like. |
16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file. | |
From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2 | |
A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point. |
9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell used the phrase 'propositional function' (adapted from Frege) to refer sometimes to predicates and sometimes to attributes. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Philosophy of Logic Ch.5 | |
A reaction: He calls Russell 'confused' on this, and he would indeed be guilty of what now looks like a classic confusion, between the properties and the predicates that express them. Only a verificationist would hold such a daft view. |
6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact, one the negation of the other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: Russell attributes this point to Wittgenstein. Evidently you must add that the proposition is true before it will name a fact - which is bad news for the redundancy view of truth. Couldn't lots of propositions correspond to one fact? |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell insists that the world does contain nonlinguistic things that are akin to sentences and are asserted by them; he merely does not call them propositions. He calls them facts. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.81 | |
A reaction: Clarification! I have always been bewildered by the early Russell view of propositions as actual ingredients of the world. If we say that sentences assert facts, that makes more sense. Russell never believed in the mental entities I call 'propositions'. |
6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is quite clear that propositions are not what you might call 'real'; if you were making an inventory of the world, propositions would not come in. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III) | |
A reaction: I am not clear why this is "quite clear". Propositions might even turn up in our ontology as physical objects (brain states). He says beliefs are real, but if you can't have a belief without a proposition, and they aren't real, you are in trouble. |
6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
Full Idea: Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going about as 'That today is Wednesday' when in fact it is Tuesday. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.2) | |
A reaction: You need to give some account of someone who thinks 'Today is Wednesday' when it is Tuesday. We can hardly avoid talking about something like an 'intentional object', which can be expressed in a sentence. Are there not possible (formulable) propositions? |
21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
Full Idea: Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going about such 'That today is Wednesday' when it is in fact Tuesday. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], p.197), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 3.1 | |
A reaction: [Ref to Papers v8] I take Russell to have abandoned his propositions because his conception of them was mistaken. Presumably my thinking 'Today is Wednesay' conjures up a false proposition, which had not previously existed. |
6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
Full Idea: A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would be, as regards its vocabulary, very largely private to one speaker; that is, all the names in it would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §II) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein obviously thought there was something not quite right about this… See Idea 4147, for example. I presume Russell's thought is that you would have no means of explaining the 'meanings' of the names in the language. |
6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
Full Idea: The fact that you can discuss the proposition 'God exists' is a proof that 'God', as used in that proposition, is a description and not a name. If 'God' were a name, no question as to its existence could arise. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'a being than which none greater can be conceived' (Anselm's definition) is self-evidently a description, and doesn't claim to be a name. Aquinas caps each argument with a triumphant naming of the being he has proved. |