5784
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In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
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Full Idea:
We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
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A reaction:
I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
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5783
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Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
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A reaction:
An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
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5780
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The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
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Full Idea:
There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
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A reaction:
The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
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5778
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If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
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Full Idea:
If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
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A reaction:
Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
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5781
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Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
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A reaction:
This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
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5782
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A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
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A reaction:
This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
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5078
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Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
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A reaction:
A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
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5067
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Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
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5079
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Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
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A reaction:
Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
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5068
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'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
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5077
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The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
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A reaction:
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
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5066
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If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
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