|
15784
|
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
|
|
Full Idea:
A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point?
|
|
From:
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
|
|
A reaction:
See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too.
|
|
5784
|
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
|
|
A reaction:
I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
|
|
5783
|
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
|
|
A reaction:
An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
|
|
14753
|
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
|
|
Full Idea:
Burke claims that the 'dominant' sortal is the one whose satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties. For example, the statue (unlike the lump of clay) also possesses aesthetic properties, and hence is dominant.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
|
|
A reaction:
[there are three papers by Burke on this; see all the quotations from Burke] Presumably one sortal could entail a single very important property, and the other sortal entail a huge range of trivial properties. What does being a 'thing' entail?
|
|
16072
|
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
|
|
Full Idea:
Burke distinguishes three different readings of 'the rock'. It can be a singular description denoting an object, or a plural description denoting all the little pieces of rock, or a mass description the relevant rocky stuff.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5
|
|
A reaction:
Idea 16068 is an objection to the second reading. Only the first reading seems plausible, so we must just get over all the difficulties philosophers have unearthed about knowing exactly what an 'object' is. I offer you essentialism. Rocks have unity.
|
|
16234
|
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
|
|
Full Idea:
Michael Burke argues that a sweater is identical with the thread that consitutes it, that both were created at the moment when they began to coincide, and that the original thread was destroyed in the process.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3
|
|
A reaction:
[Burke's ideas are spread over three articles] It is the thread which is destroyed, because the sweater is the 'dominant sortal' (which strikes me as a particularlyd desperate concept).
|
|
14750
|
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
|
|
Full Idea:
Michael Burke has given an account that avoids distinguishing coinciding entities. ...The statue/lump satisfies both 'lump' and 'statue', but only the latter determines that object's persistence conditions, and so is that object's 'dominant sortal'.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
|
|
A reaction:
Presumably a lump on its own can have its own persistance conditions (as a 'lump'), but those would presumably be lost if you shaped it into a statue. Burke concedes that. Can of worms. Using a book as a doorstop...
|
|
15794
|
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
|
|
Full Idea:
If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.
|
|
From:
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
|
|
A reaction:
[Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.
|
|
5780
|
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
|
|
A reaction:
The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
|
|
5778
|
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
|
|
A reaction:
Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
|
|
5781
|
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
|
|
A reaction:
This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
|
|
5782
|
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
|
|
A reaction:
This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
|