Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'On the Happy Life'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca]
     Full Idea: I do not call any man wise who is subservient to anything.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §11)
     A reaction: At the very least, a wise man should be subservient to a wiser man.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
     Full Idea: It might be said that Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
     A reaction: I don't buy this, if it meant to be dismissive of the relevance of the principle to truth. A deep question might be, what is so aesthetically attractive about simplicity? I'm inclined to think that application of the Razor has delivered terrific results.
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
     Full Idea: A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point?
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
     A reaction: See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
     Full Idea: We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
     A reaction: I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
     Full Idea: I take it as evident that the truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
     A reaction: A nice bold commitment to a controversial idea. The traditional objection is to ask how you are going to formulate the 'facts' except in terms of more beliefs, so you ending up comparing beliefs. Facts are a metaphysical commitment, not an acquaintance.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
     Full Idea: The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
     A reaction: An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Meinong's Objects have sometimes been construed as sets of properties.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
     A reaction: [Lycan cites Castaņeda and T.Parsons] You still seem to have the problem with any 'bundle' theory of anything. A non-existent object is as much intended to be an object as anything on my desk right now. It just fails to be.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
     Full Idea: A mentalistic approach to possible worlds is daunted by the paucity of actual mental events.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
     A reaction: Why do they have to be actual, any more than memories have to be conscious? The mental events just need to be available when you need them. They are never all required simultaneously. This isn't mathematical logic!
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
     Full Idea: I believe the only promising choice of actual entities to serve as 'worlds' is that of sets of intensional objects, such as propositions or properties with stipulated interrelations.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 12)
     A reaction: This is mainly in response to Lewis's construction of them out of actual concrete objects. It strikes me as a bogus problem. It is just a convenient way to think precisely about possibilities, and occasionally outruns our mental capacity.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
     Full Idea: If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
     A reaction: [Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
     Full Idea: There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
     A reaction: The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
     Full Idea: If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
     A reaction: Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
     Full Idea: There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
     A reaction: This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
     Full Idea: The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
     A reaction: This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
     Full Idea: I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
     A reaction: This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
     Full Idea: A proposition may be defined as: what we believe when we believe truly or falsely.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
     A reaction: If we define belief as 'commitment to truth', Russell's last six words become redundant. "Propositions are the contents of beliefs", it being beliefs which are candidates for truth, not propositions. (Russell agrees, on p.308!)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The highest good is harmony of spirit.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §08)
     A reaction: This idea is straight from Plato's Republic.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca]
     Full Idea: You ask what I seek from virtue? Virtue herself. For she has nothing better, she is herself her own reward.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §09)
     A reaction: Presumably this is the source of the popular saying that 'virtue is its own reward'. The trouble is that this doesn't seem a very persuasive thing to say to a sceptic who doubts whether being virtuous is worth the trouble.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca]
     Full Idea: In the case of virtue excess should not be feared, since in virtue resides moderation.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §13)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that all of the virtues are unified in the one achievement of the virtuous state. It leaves the notion of 'virtue' a bit thin in content, though.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Why, to your shame, are you so careless that you do not know your handful of slaves by sight?
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca]
     Full Idea: What doubt can there be that the wise man has greater scope for displaying his powers if he is rich than if he is poor, since in the case of poverty only one kind of virtue exists - refusal to be bowed down and crushed.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §22)
     A reaction: It is against this view that I see Jesus proposing poverty as central to virtue. But then he has the surprising view (to Seneca) that humility is a virtue. What Nietzsche calls the slaves' inversion of values.
Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house?
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17)
If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Wealth is not a good; for it it was, it would make men good.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §24)
     A reaction: An immediately attractive argument, but should we assume that anything which is good will enhance our personal goodness? If goodness is a habit, then continual pursuit of wealth is the test case to examine. Seneca is right!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Human concerns are not so happily arranged that the majority favours the better things.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §02)
     A reaction: On the whole Seneca is unimpressed by democracy, as people are rushed into decisions by the crowd, and live to regret them.