3 ideas
8732 | It is spooky the way mathematics anticipates physics [Weinberg] |
Full Idea: It is positively spooky how the physicist finds the mathematician has been there before him or her. | |
From: Steven Weinberg (Lecture on Applicability of Mathematics [1986], p.725), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 2.3 | |
A reaction: This suggests that mathematics might be the study of possibilities or hypotheticals, like mental rehearsals for physics. See Hellman's modal structuralism. Maybe mathematicians are reading the mind of God, but I doubt that. |
8628 | I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons] |
Full Idea: I hold that algebra is a highly developed logic, and number but logical discrimination. | |
From: William S. Jevons (The Principles of Science [1879], p.156), quoted by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §15 | |
A reaction: Thus Frege shows that logicism was an idea that was in the air before he started writing. Riemann's geometry and Boole's logic presumably had some influence here. |
22307 | Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is perfectly evident that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact. 'Socrates is dead' and 'Socrates is not dead' correspond to the same fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1918 [1918], VIII.136), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Prop' | |
A reaction: He finally reaches in 1918 what now looks fairly obvious. The idea that a proposition is part of the world is absurd. We should call the parts of the world 'facts' (despite vagueness and linguistic dependence in such things). Propositions are thoughts. |