6 ideas
10121 | Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal] |
Full Idea: Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the lack of contradiction a sign of truth. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (works [1660]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: [Quoted in Auden and Kronenberger's Book of Aphorisms] Presumably we would now say that contradiction is a purely formal, syntactic notion, and not a semantic one. If you hit a contradiction, something has certainly gone wrong. |
21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely described, is not properly intelligible. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Wang's Paradox [1970], p.260) | |
A reaction: It seems hard to disagree with this. It seems crazy that a pile of grain, or the hair on someone's head, are vague, and even quantum indeterminacies are not very well described as 'vague'. Vagueness is a very human concept. |
22692 | A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E] |
Full Idea: A work that rejects moral truth can be artistically excellent, in part because of its moral content. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intr) | |
A reaction: She cites the film 'Trainspotting', about desperate drug addicts, because it gives an amoral insight into their world. |
22693 | The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E] |
Full Idea: The works we tend to value most highly are ones that are in sympathy with the moral views we actually accept. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: I would have to endorse this. She admits that we may rate other works very highly, but they won't appear on our list of favourites. This fact may well distort philosophical discussions of morality and art. |
22694 | We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E] |
Full Idea: Our responses to literature should show that we grasp whatever counts as morally important within the narrative, but not necessarily that we judge and feel in the way deemed appropriate by the work. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Accommodating') | |
A reaction: She gives as an example a story by Hemingway which places a high value on the courageous hunting of big game. A second example is the total amorality of a Highsmith novel. This idea seems exactly right to me. |
22695 | We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E] |
Full Idea: Moral value is valuable in art because people care about moral value. This runs deep, but it is a contingent matter, and the value of morality in art hinges on art's need to provide something precious to us. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Contingency') | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. Thrillers are written with very little moral concern, for a readership which cares about brave and exciting deeds. Even there, violence has its ethics. |