Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Trinity', 'The Raft and the Pyramid' and 'reports of last days'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates]
     Full Idea: The unexamined life is not worth living for men.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 38a
     A reaction: I wonder why? I can see Nietzsche offering aristocratic heroes and dancers as counterexamples. Compare Idea 3798.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If I have a headache, I could have a set of beliefs that I do not have a headache, that I am not in pain, that no one is in pain, and so on. The resulting system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §9)
     A reaction: I think this is a misunderstanding of coherentism. Beliefs are not to be formulated through a process of coherence, but are evaluated that way. A belief that I have headache just arrives; I then see that its denial is incoherent, so I accept it.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius]
     Full Idea: Is it not now clear what the difference is between items in the categories? Some serve to refer to a thing, whereas others serve to refer to the circumstances of a thing.
     From: Boethius (Concerning the Trinity [c.518], Ch. 4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Radical foundationalism suffers from two weaknesses: there are not so many perfectly obvious truths as Descartes thought; and if we restrict ourselves to what it truly obvious, very little supposed common sense knowledge can be proved.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §3)
     A reaction: It is striking how few examples can ever be found of self-evident a priori truths. However, if there are self-evident truths about direct experience (pace Descartes), that would give us more than enough.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
     Full Idea: A single belief can trail at once regresses of both sorts: one terminating and one not.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §6)
     A reaction: This makes foundationalism possible, while admitting the existence of regresses. It is a good point, and triumphalist anti-foundationalists can't just point out a regress and then smugly troop off to the pub.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb?
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11)
     A reaction: This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing.
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If a mental state provides no guarantee against error, then it cannot serve as a foundation for knowledge.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §4)
     A reaction: That assumes that knowledge entails certainty, which I am sure it should not. On a fallibilist account, a foundation could be incredibly secure, despite a barely imaginable scenario in which it turned out to be false.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Visual experience is recognized as both the cause and the justification of our visual beliefs. But these are not wholly independent. Presumably the justification that something is red derives partly from the fact that it originates in visual experience.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §10)
     A reaction: Yes, but the fact that certain visual experiences originate in dreams is taken as grounds for denying their truth, not affirming it. So why do we distinguish them? I am thinking that only in the 'space of reasons' can a cause become a justification.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates]
     Full Idea: No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 29a
     A reaction: As a neutral observer, I see little sign of it being a blessing, except as a relief from misery. It seem wrong to view such a natural thing as evil, but it is the thing most of us least desire.
If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates]
     Full Idea: If death is like a night of dreamless sleep it is an advantage, for such nights are very pleasant, and eternity would seem like a single night.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 40d
     A reaction: Dreamless sleep is only pleasant if being awake is unpleasant. Very quiet days are only pleasant if the active days are horrible. A desire for a totally quiet life is absurd.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates]
     Full Idea: One should never return an injustice nor harm another human being no matter what one suffers at their hands.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49c
     A reaction: Jesus of Nazareth was not the first person to make this suggestion.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates]
     Full Idea: A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 41d
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates]
     Full Idea: One ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49b
     A reaction: The same as the essential moral teachings of Jesus (see Idea 6288) and Lao Tzu (Idea 6324). The big target is not to be corrupted by the evil of other people.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates]
     Full Idea: Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men.
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 30b
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates]
     Full Idea: Do I intend to destroy the laws, because the state wronged me by passing a faulty judgement at my trial?
     From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 50c
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates denies the gods, because he says the sun is stone and the moon is earth.
     From: report of Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]) by Plato - The Apology 26d