Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Trinity', 'Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation)' and 'Disquisitions'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege]
     Full Idea: There is so intimate a connection between the concepts of addition and of quantity that one cannot begin to grasp the latter without the former.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation) [1874], p.2), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 22 'Quantit'
     A reaction: Frege offers good reasons for making cardinals prior to ordinals, though plenty of people disagree.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege]
     Full Idea: The elements of all geometrical constructions are intuitions, and geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation) [1874], Ch.6), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics
     A reaction: Very early Frege, but he stuck to this view, while firmly rejecting intuition as a source of arithmetic. Frege would have known well that Euclid's assumption about parallels had been challenged.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius]
     Full Idea: Is it not now clear what the difference is between items in the categories? Some serve to refer to a thing, whereas others serve to refer to the circumstances of a thing.
     From: Boethius (Concerning the Trinity [c.518], Ch. 4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: Modes are not nothing but something more than mere nothing; they are therefore 'res' of some kind, not substantial of course, but at least modal.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Disquisitions [1644], II.3.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 260
     A reaction: This is the great modern atomist talking pure scholastic metaphysics. He's been reading Suárez. Gassendi seems to accept more than one type of existence.