3 ideas
| 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Spatial, temporal, and other primary properties and relationships are not causal powers. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (Response to David Armstrong [1999], p.42), quoted by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 10.4 | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see how time and space could actually be powers, but future results in physics (or even current results about 'fields') might change that. |
| 17319 | There are 'conceptual' explanations, with their direction depending on complexity [Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: The direction of conceptual explanations seems to be owed to factors of conceptual complexity and primitiveness. | |
| From: Benjamin Schnieder (Truth-making without Truth-makers [2006], p.33), quoted by David Liggins - Truth-makers and dependence 10.2 | |
| A reaction: Schnieder proposes that there are just 'causal' and 'conceptual' explanations. Liggins objects that there are other types of dependence which offer explanations. |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations). | |
| From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii | |
| A reaction: Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise. |