12 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
Full Idea: Despair over metaphysics will not change until it has shaken off the incubus of a perverted epistemology, which has left thought in a hopeless tangle - until common-sense critical realism is made the starting point for investigating reality. | |
From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.144) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that this is what has happened to analytic metaphysics since Kripke. Careful discussions about the nature of an object, or a category, or a property, are relying on unquestioned robust realism. Quite right too. |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
Full Idea: Were there no inflexible reality outside of the individual, opposing and limiting it, knowledge of the self and the non-self would never develop. | |
From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.140) | |
A reaction: Presumably opponents would have to say that such 'knowledge' is an illusion. This is in no way a conclusive argument, but I approach the problem of realism in quest of the best explanation, and this idea is important evidence. |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
Full Idea: It is the determination of the external world from the practical standpoint, from the standpoint of interest, that may be defined as the common-sense view of reality. | |
From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.141) | |
A reaction: Probably more appropriately named the 'pragmatic' view of reality. Relying on what is 'practical' seems to offer some objectivity, but relying on 'interest' rather less so. Can I be an anti-realist when life goes badly, and a realist when it goes well? |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
Full Idea: If objects are doubted because the same object appears differently at different times and circumstances, in order that this judgement shall have weight it must be assumed that the object under question is the same in its different presentations. | |
From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.145) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Scepticism could eat into the underlying object as well. Is the underlying object a 'substrate'? If so, what's that? Is the object just a bundle of a properties? If so, there is no underlying object. |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
Full Idea: Arguments for the absolute unknowability or non-existence of an external object only works by assuming that another external object, an individual, is known completely in so far as that individual expresses a judgement about an external object. | |
From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.145) | |
A reaction: Anti-realism is a decay that eats into everything. You can't doubt all the externals without doubting all the internals as well. |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
Full Idea: The doctrine [that all we can know is the relations between subject and object] is in its essence self-contradictory, since our very idea of thing implies that it is something in relation either actually or potentially. | |
From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.150) | |
A reaction: Ladyman and Ross try to defend an account of reality based entirely on relations. I'm with Colvin on this one. All accounts of reality based either on pure relations or pure functions have a huge hole in their theory. |
4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation. | |
From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1) | |
A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings. |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
Full Idea: There are three hierarchies of natural kinds: objects or substances (substantive universals), events or processes (dynamic universals), and properties or relations (tropic universals). | |
From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91) | |
A reaction: Most interesting here is the identifying of natural kinds with universals, making universals into the families of nature. Universals are high-level sets of natural kinds. To grasp universals you must see patterns, and infer the underlying order. |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The principle of least action is not a causal law, but is what I call a 'global law', which describes the essence of the global kind, which every object in the universe necessarily instantiates. | |
From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005]) | |
A reaction: As a fan of essentialism I find this persuasive. If I inherit part of my essence from being a mammal, I inherit other parts of my essence from being an object, and all objects would share that essence, so it would look like a 'law' for all objects. |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A specific universal can exist only if the generic universal of which it is a species exists, but generic universals don't depend on species; …the essence of any genus is included in its species, but not conversely. | |
From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91) | |
A reaction: Thus the species 'electron' would be part of the genus 'lepton', or 'human' part of 'mammal'. The point of all this is to show how individual items connect up with the rest of the universe, giving rise to universal laws, such as Least Action. |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The hierarchy of natural kinds proposed by essentialism may be more elaborate than is strictly required for purposes of ontology, but it is necessary to explain the necessity of the laws of nature, and the universal applicability of global principles. | |
From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91) | |
A reaction: I am all in favour of elaborating ontology in the name of best explanation. There seem, though, to be some remaining ontological questions at the point where the explanations of essentialism run out. |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
Full Idea: It is objected to dispositionalism that without the principle of least action, or some general principle of equal power, the specific dispositional properties of things could tell us very little about how these things would be disposed to behave. | |
From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 90) | |
A reaction: Ellis attempts to meet this criticism, by placing dispositional properties within a hierarchy of broader properties. There remains a nagging doubt about how essentialism can account for space, time, order, and the existence of essences. |