16908
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We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake.
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From:
comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4
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A reaction:
Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine?
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6563
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'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
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Full Idea:
Wittgenstein's 'fundamental idea' is that the 'and' and 'not' which guarantee the truth of "not p and not-p" are meaningful, but do not get their meaning by representing or standing for or referring to some kind of entity; they are non-referring terms.
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From:
report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], §37) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
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A reaction:
Wittgenstein then defines the terms using truth tables, to show what they do, rather than what they stand for. This seems to me to be a candidate for the single most important idea in the history of the philosophy of logic.
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22323
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The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of wh9ch psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 1916. 2 Sep), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 58 Intro
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A reaction:
This is to treat the self as a phenomenon of thought, rather than of a human being. So if a machine could think, would it hence necessarily have a metaphysical self?
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4678
|
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
If suicide is allowed, then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed, then suicide is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], end), quoted by Jonathan Glover - Causing Death and Saving Lives §13
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A reaction:
This reveals the religious streak in Wittgenstein. I am reluctant to judge suicide, but this seems wrong. Should a 'jumper' worry if they land on someone else and kill them? Of course they should.
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6616
|
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
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Full Idea:
The principle of least action is not a causal law, but is what I call a 'global law', which describes the essence of the global kind, which every object in the universe necessarily instantiates.
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From:
Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005])
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A reaction:
As a fan of essentialism I find this persuasive. If I inherit part of my essence from being a mammal, I inherit other parts of my essence from being an object, and all objects would share that essence, so it would look like a 'law' for all objects.
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6615
|
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
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Full Idea:
A specific universal can exist only if the generic universal of which it is a species exists, but generic universals don't depend on species; …the essence of any genus is included in its species, but not conversely.
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From:
Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91)
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A reaction:
Thus the species 'electron' would be part of the genus 'lepton', or 'human' part of 'mammal'. The point of all this is to show how individual items connect up with the rest of the universe, giving rise to universal laws, such as Least Action.
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6614
|
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
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Full Idea:
The hierarchy of natural kinds proposed by essentialism may be more elaborate than is strictly required for purposes of ontology, but it is necessary to explain the necessity of the laws of nature, and the universal applicability of global principles.
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From:
Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91)
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A reaction:
I am all in favour of elaborating ontology in the name of best explanation. There seem, though, to be some remaining ontological questions at the point where the explanations of essentialism run out.
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6612
|
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]
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Full Idea:
It is objected to dispositionalism that without the principle of least action, or some general principle of equal power, the specific dispositional properties of things could tell us very little about how these things would be disposed to behave.
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From:
Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 90)
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A reaction:
Ellis attempts to meet this criticism, by placing dispositional properties within a hierarchy of broader properties. There remains a nagging doubt about how essentialism can account for space, time, order, and the existence of essences.
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