Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'City of God' and 'Letters to Descartes'

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I must exist in order to be mistaken, so that even if I am mistaken, I can't be wrong about my own existence [Augustine]
     Full Idea: Since therefore I must exist in order to be mistaken, then even if I am mistaken, there can be no doubt that I am not mistaken in my knowledge that I exist…. I know that I exist, and I also know that I know.
     From: Augustine (City of God [c.427], Ch.XI.26)
     A reaction: Fine, but the main problem is his over-confidence about a stable personal identity that does the thinking.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The contact of spirit and body is utterly amazing, and incomprehensible [Augustine]
     Full Idea: The manner of contact of spirit with body, which produces a living being, is utterly amazing and beyond our powers of comprehension
     From: Augustine (City of God [c.427], XXI.10)
     A reaction: This leads to a rather clear objection against a theory which needs a miracle to explain a common natural phenomenon. At least Augustine was beginning to recognise that interaction is a bit of a problem.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
A soul with physical extension is more likely than an immaterial soul that moves bodies [Elizabeth]
     Full Idea: I would find it easier to concede matter and extension to the soul than to concede that an immaterial thing could move and be moved by a body.
     From: Elizabeth, Princess of Bohemia (Letters to Descartes [1643], p.42), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2
     A reaction: Very nicely expressed! I'm trying to imagine a ghost which finds itself stuck with a physical body which it has to drag around like a reluctant dog. She is stating the classic interaction problem which plagues all mind-body dualism.