4 ideas
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) | |
A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time. |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Block's Inverted Earth example (with matching inversion of both colours and colour-language) tries to show a variation of representational properties without a variation of phenomenal properties, so that the latter are not constituted by the former. | |
From: report of Ned Block (Inverted Earth [1990]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.7 | |
A reaction: (The example is actually quite complex). This type of argument - a thought experiment in which qualia are held steady while everything else varies, or vice versa - seems to be the only way that we can possibly get at an assessment of the role of qualia. |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |