Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason' and 'Ecce Homo'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Wise §7)
     A reaction: And what do pacifist philosophers do? It is a moot point whether philosophy is even possible without a streak of aggression. Otherwise you circle the problem, but don't confront it.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: What (in the analysis of substances) exist ultimately are simple substances - namely, souls, or, if you prefer a more general terms, 'monads', which are without parts.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §7)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be atomistic panpsychism. He is opposed to physical atomism, because infinite divisibility seems obvious, but unity is claimed to be equally obvious in the world of the mental. Does this mean bricks are made of souls? Odd.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There are neither egoistic nor unegoistic actions: both concepts are psychologically nonsense.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], 4.5)
     A reaction: Not quite true, but I like this observation. The idea that you could divide everyone's actions into these two groups is certainly nonsense. But some people are more altruistic than others!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I should prefer to exclude the bad result, the consequences, from the question of value as a matter of principle. Faced with a bad result, one loses all too easily the right perspective for what one has done.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Clever §1)
     A reaction: If the perspective is easily lost, we should make more effort, not ignore consequences. The question is whether you could have foreseen or controlled the consequences.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Wise §4)
     A reaction: Hm. I can just about see that there might be more important things than compassion for suffering, but I can't see any human activity that makes it worthwhile to trample on pity.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
To become what you are you must have no self-awareness [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion of what one is.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], II.9), quoted by Brian Leiter - Nietzsche On Morality 3 'fatalism'
     A reaction: [Don't understand 'II.9'] Enigmatic but striking. As I understand it, Nietzsche thought that knowing what you are is virtually impossible, though he spent a lifetime studying himself. Would you recognise someone who had become what they are?
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Eternal recurrence is the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], III.Z-1?), quoted by Brian Leiter - Nietzsche On Morality
     A reaction: Did Nietzsche have in mind an even higher formulation that was unattainable? The aim of eternal recurrence is to offer the highest possible ideal that remains rooted in the nature of ordinary life. It is a cut-down version of the Form of the Good.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Fore)
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In all of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but wise; and with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved the rule of wisdom through final causes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §5)
     A reaction: Nowadays this carrot-and-stick view of causation is unfashionable, but I won't rule it out. The deepest 'why?' we can ask won't just go away. This unity by a divine mind strikes me as too simple, but Leibniz is right to try to unify Aristotelian causes.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I have absolutely no knowledge of atheism as an outcome of reasoning, still less an event: with me it is obvious by instinct.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], 3.1)