12735
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Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It follows from the nature of God that there is a fixed power of a definite magnitude [non vagam] in anything whatsoever, otherwise there would be no reasonings about those things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De aequopollentia causae et effectus [1679], A6.4.1964), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
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A reaction:
This is double-edged. On the one hand there is the grand claim that the principle derives from divine nature, but on the other it derives from our capacity to reason and explain. No one doubts that powers are 'fixed'.
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12719
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Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
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A reaction:
For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.
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