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13169
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I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.
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13170
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The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
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A reaction:
I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.
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13193
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Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
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A reaction:
This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds).
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13194
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God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
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A reaction:
This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.
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13167
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We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.
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13192
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Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
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A reaction:
This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul.
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