11 ideas
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To find real entities I had recourse to a unified formal atom. Hence I rehabilitated the substantial forms in a way to render them intelligible. I found that their nature consists in force, from which follows something analogous to sensation and appetite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139) | |
A reaction: [several lines are here compressed] This passage sums up the key to Leibniz's essentialism, which I take to be a connection between Aristotelian form and the physicists' notion of force. This gives us a modern version of Aristotelianism for science. |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139) | |
A reaction: As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without. |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142) | |
A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects. |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144) | |
A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change. |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |
22971 | In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx] |
Full Idea: Between the capitalist and communist society lies the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: This hugely influential idea was catastrophic for the twentieth century, because the leaders of the proletarian dictatorship adored and abused the power, and wouldn't give it up for some feeble next stage. |
22000 | From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx] |
Full Idea: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875]), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
A reaction: Singer says this was not original to Marx, and he placed little emphasis on it. The obvious capitalist response is to ask how you will motivate someone who has huge abilities but few needs. It implies huge inequalities of altruism. |
22970 | Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx] |
Full Idea: Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one completely subordinate to it. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: The intermediate stage is dictatorship of the proletariat (presumably exercised by the communist leadership). No twentieth century marxist state ever got near the freedom which Marx was seeking. A liberal society might achieve it! |
22969 | People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx] |
Full Idea: The man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can only work with their permission. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], I) | |
A reaction: In a world of vast multinationals, the person giving the permission to work is nearly always dependent on some higher level permission. In any sort of society people can only work with the consensus of other people. |
22972 | Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx] |
Full Idea: Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' is just the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom of conscience, and the workers' party should endeavour to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: We see this in modern 'faith' schools in the UK, which do not seem to be required to live up to the standards of freedom of belief expected in the rest of a liberal society. |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139) | |
A reaction: We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive. |