Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'What is an Idea?' and 'Truth'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2)
     A reaction: Everything is in the world. This may just be a quibble over how we should use the word 'fact'. At some point the substance of what is stated in a sentence must eventually be out there, or we would never act on what we say.
Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about. ..But it would be wrong to identify 'fact' and 'true statement' for these expressions have different roles in our language.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2)
     A reaction: Personally I like to reserve the word 'facts' for what is out there, independent of any human thought or speech. As a realist, I believe that the facts are quite independent of our attempts to understand the facts. True statements attempt to state facts.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: What could fit more perfectly the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining?
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2)
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: It is of prime importance to distinguish the fact that the use of 'true' always glances backwards or forwards to the actual or envisaged making of a statement by someone.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §1)
     A reaction: 'The truth of this matter will never be known'. Strawson is largely right, but it is crazy for any philosopher to use the word 'always' if they can possibly avoid it.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: What I mean by an idea is not a certain act of thinking, but a power or faculty such that we have an idea of a thing even if we are not thinking about it but know that we can think it when the occasion arises.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (What is an Idea? [1676], p.281)
     A reaction: 'Idea' tends to be used in the seventeenth century to mean an actual mental event. It is because Leibniz believes in the unconscious mind that he can offer this rather different, and probably superior, notion of an 'idea'.