Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'talk' and 'Form, Matter and Substance'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Some of the most important debates in metaphysics or ontology do not concern existential questions, but focus on questions of fundamentality.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 5 Intro)
     A reaction: In modern times we have added the structure of existence to the mere ontological catalogue, and this idea makes another important addition to our concept of metaphysics. She gives disagreement over tropes as an example.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam]
     Full Idea: Poincaré once exclaimed, 'Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no!'.
     From: report of Henri Poincaré (talk [1901]) by Hilary Putnam - Models and Reality
     A reaction: An interesting view. It mustn't be assumed that conventions are not rooted in something. Maybe a sort of pragmatism is implied.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: A structured whole derives its unity from the way in which its parts interact with other parts to allow both the whole and its parts to manifest those of their capacities which require 'team work' among the parts.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], Intro)
     A reaction: This is a culminating thesis of her book. She defends it at length. It looks like a nice theory for things which are lucky enough to have capacities involving teamwork. Does this mean a pebble can't be unified? She wants a dynamic view.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Hylomorphists tend to agree that the form (rather than matter) explains 1) kind membership, 2) structure, 3) unity, 4) characteristic activities.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.2.1)
     A reaction: [compressed; she explains each of them] Personally I would add continuity through change (statue/clay). Glad to see that kind membership is not part of the form. And what about explaining observed properties? Does form=essence?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: It is difficult to see how forms could serve as cross-world identity principles for hylomorphic compounds, unless these forms are particular or individual entities.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.4.3)
     A reaction: This is a key part of her objection to treating the form as universal or generic. I agree with her view.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.