7 ideas
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth. |
15312 | We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley] |
Full Idea: A rope sustains weight, a magnet attracts iron, a charged electrical jar gives a shock, and from these and other similar observations, we get the idea of power, universally and abstractly considered. | |
From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.191), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B | |
A reaction: I agree with this, in that we appear to be observing powers directly, and are not observing something which can then be reduced to non-powers. Nature just can't be a set of inert structures, with forces 'imposed' on them. |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash. |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog) | |
A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society? |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights. |
15311 | Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley] |
Full Idea: Attraction or repulsion appear to me not to be properly what is imparted to matter, but what really makes it what it is, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all. | |
From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.237), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B | |
A reaction: This is music to the ears of anyone who thinks that powers are the fundamentals of nature (like me). |