Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Parthood and Identity across Time' and 'The Basing Relation'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

13267	Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Thomson famously objects that the doctrine of temporal parts is 'a crazy metaphysic - obviously false', since it entails that material objects are constantly being generated ex nihilo (or, at least, the stuff of which they are composed is).
	From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (Parthood and Identity across Time [1983], p.210) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 2.2
	A reaction: The related objections are to ask what the temporal 'width' of a part is, and whether the joins are visible.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs

19696	There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between something's being a 'reason for which' a creature believes something, and its being a 'reason why' a creature believes something. ...We must also distinguish a 'reason for which' from a 'reason to' believe something.
	From: Ram Neta (The Basing Relation [2011], Intro)
	A reaction: He doesn't spell the distinctions out clearly. I take it that 'for which' is my personal justification, 'why' is the dodgy prejudices that cause my belief. and 'to' is some actual good reasons, of which I may be unaware.

19697	The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]
	Full Idea: A reason has a 'basing relation' with a belief if it (i) rationally supports holding the belief, and (ii) explains why the belief is held.
	From: Ram Neta (The Basing Relation [2011], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably a false reason would fit this account. Why not talk of 'grounding', or is that word now reserved for metaphysics? If I hypnotise you into a belief, would my hypnotic power be the basing reason? Fits (ii), but not (i).

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection

3102	Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
	Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
	From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
	A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.