Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'The Virtues and Human Nature' and 'The Making of a Philosopher'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


9 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
     Full Idea: If there were nothing more to our mind than our conscious awareness, then we would be unable to see anything or to process speech.
     From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: A vital point. Traditional dualism has left us a simplistic exaggeration of the role of consciousness, and the misapprehension that most of what we do is conscious - which it clearly isn't, once you think about it.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]
     Full Idea: The importance of Grice's analysis of speaker meaning is that it offers the prospect of analysing the whole phenomenon of linguistic meaning in terms of propositional attitudes… thus turning semantics into a department of the philosophy of mind.
     From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: Although meaning being truth conditions is the most cited theory, the reduction of semantics to an aspect of mind also seems almost orthodox now. But how do the symbols 'represent' the attitudes?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
     Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3)
     A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver]
     Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3)
     A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it.
Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver]
     Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime.
Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver]
     Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3)
     A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea.
Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver]
     Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5)
     A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver]
     Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5)
     A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes.