29 ideas
20455 | Philosophy really got started as the rival mode of discourse to tragedy [Critchley] |
Full Idea: The pre-Socratics are interesting, but philosophy really begins in drama; it's a competitive discourse to tragedy. Which is why Plato's 'Republic' excludes the poets: they're the competition; gotta get rid of them. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 6) | |
A reaction: That's an interesting and novel perspective. So what was the 'discourse' of tragedy saying, and why did that provoke the new rival? Was it too fatalistic? |
20446 | Philosophy begins in disappointment, notably in religion and politics [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I claim that philosophy begins in disappointment, and there are two forms of disappointment that interest me: religious and political disappointment | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: You are only disappointed by reality if you expected something better. To be disappointed by the failures of religion strikes me as rather old-fashioned, which Critchley sort of admits. Given the size and tumult of modern states, politics isn't promising. |
20449 | Science gives us an excessively theoretical view of life [Critchley] |
Full Idea: One of the problems with the scientific worldview is that it leads human beings to have an overwhelmingly theoretical relationship to the world. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: Critchley is defending phenomenology, but this also supports its cousin, existentialism. I keep meeting bright elderly men who have immersed themselves in the study of science, and they seem very remote from the humanist culture I love. |
20448 | Phenomenology uncovers and redescribes the pre-theoretical layer of life [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology is a philosophical method that tries to uncover the pre-theoretical layer of human experience and redescribe it. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: I would be delighted if someone could tell me what this means in practice. I have the impression of lots of talk about phenomenology, but not much doing of it. Clearly I must enquire further. |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The usual Tarskian way of indicating how a variable is to be interpreted is to simply specify its range of values. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.B) |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The alternative Tarskian way of indicating how a variable is to be interpreted is that a variable x will be a special case of the semantic value of the term; it will be a function which takes each assignment into the individual which it assigns to x. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.B) |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Once Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of significance to be said. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: He later remarks that there are now three semantic accounts: the Tarskian, the instantial, and the algebraic [see xref ideas]. He offers a fourth account in his Semantic Relationism. This grows from his puzzles about variables. |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: When we consider the semantic role of 'x' and 'y' in two distinct expressions x>0 and y>0, their semantic roles seems the same. But in the same expression, such as x>y, their roles seem to be different. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.A) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This new puzzle about variables leads Fine to say that the semantics of variables, and other expressions, is not intrinsic to them, but depends on their external relations. Variables denote any term - unless another variable got there first. |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In the 'algebraic' approach to variables, we move from a quantified sentence to the term specifying a property (the λ-term), and then reducing to the algebraic operations for atomic formulas. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.C) | |
A reaction: [Bealer is a source for this view] Fine describes it as an 'algebra of operations'. I presume this is a thoroughly formalist approach to the matter, which doesn't seem to get to the heart of the semantic question. |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: According to the 'instantial' approach to variables, a closed quantified sentence is to be understood on the basis of one of its instances; from an understanding of an instance we understand satisfaction by an arbitrary individual. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.D) | |
A reaction: Fine comments that this is intuitively plausible, but not very precise, because it depends on 'abstraction' of the individual from the expression. |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There may be a semantic relationship between 'Cicero' and 'Cicero' that does not hold between 'Cicero' and 'Tully', despite the lack of an intrinsic semantic difference between the names themselves. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.E) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea of Fine's book, and a most original and promising approach to a rather intractable problem in reference. He goes on to distinguish names which are 'strictly' coreferential (the first pair) from those that are 'accidentally' so. |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I can only represent two individuals as being the same if I do not already represent them as the same. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A) | |
A reaction: A very nice simple point. If I say 'Hesperus is Hesperus' I am unable to comment on the object, but 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' has a different expressive power. Start from contexts where it is necessary to say that two things are actually one. |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: 'Cicero=Cicero' and 'Cicero=Tully' are both dyadic predications. It is unnatural to suppose that the use of the same name converts a dyadic predicate into a reflexive predicate, or that there is one reference to Cicero in the first and two in the second. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A) | |
A reaction: I am deeply suspicious of the supposed 'property' of being self-identical, but that may not deny that it could be a genuine truth (shorthand for 'the C you saw is the same as the C I saw'). Having an identity makes equality with self possible. |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand mental files in terms of coordination. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A) | |
A reaction: Personally I think that the metaphor of a 'label' is much closer to the situation than that of a 'file'. Thus my concept of Cicero is labelled 'Tully', 'Roman', 'orator', 'philosophical example'... My problem is to distinguish the concept from its labels. |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is no determining the full content of what someone thinks or believes from the individual things that he thinks or believes; we must also look at the threads that tie the contents of these thoughts or beliefs together. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what 'full' content could possibly mean. Does that include all our background beliefs which we hardly ever articulate. Content comes in degrees, or needs an arbitrary boundary? |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The aim of semantics, as standardly conceived, is to assign a semantic value to each (meaningful) expression of the language under consideration. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.G) | |
A reaction: Fine is raising the difficulty that these values can get entangled with one another. He proposes 'semantic connections' as a better aim. |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In my 'Semantic Relationism' the fact that two utterances say the same thing is not entirely a matter of their intrinsic semantic features; it may also turn on semantic relationships among the utterances of their parts not reducible to those features. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: You'll need to read the book slowly several times to get the hang of this, but at least it allows that two different utterances might say the same thing (express the same proposition, I would say). |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'. |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C) | |
A reaction: [compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts']. |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F) | |
A reaction: My particular bęte noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value… |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G) | |
A reaction: The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach. |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Demonstrative uses of an indexical such as 'this' or 'that' should be taken to be anaphoric on an associated demonstration. It is a semantic requirement on the use of the indexical that it be coreferential with the demonstration. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Post 'Indexicals') | |
A reaction: Similarly 'now' must connect to looking at a clock, and 'I' to pointing at some person. The demonstration could be of a verbal event, as much as a physical one. |
20454 | Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in English [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in the English language - full stop - in my humble opinion. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 6) | |
A reaction: I include this because I tend to agree, and love Stevens. Hear recordings of him reading. I once mentioned Stevens in a conversation with Ted Hughes, and he just shrugged and said Stevens 'wasn't much of a poet'. Wrong. |
20456 | Interesting art is always organised around ethical demands [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I don't think that art can be unethical. I think that interesting art is always ethical. It is organised around ethical demands. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 8) | |
A reaction: It is a struggle to make this fit instrumental music. Critchley likes punk rock, so he might not see the problem. How to compare Bachian, Mozart, Beethovenian and Debussyian ethics? Not impossible. |
20447 | The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley] |
Full Idea: The issue is not so much justification as motivation, that in virtue of which the self can be motivated to act on some conception of the good. ...How does a self bind itself to whatever it determines as its good? | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: That is a bold and interesting idea about the starting point for ethics. It is always a problem for Aristotle, that he can offer no motivation for the quest for virtue. Contractarians start from existing motivations, but that isn't impressive. |
20452 | Anarchism used to be libertarian (especially for sexuality), but now concerns responsibility [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Anarchism in the 1960s was libertarian and organised around issues of sexual liberation. That moment has passed. People are and should be organising around responsibility. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: So there are two types of anarchism, focused on freedom or on responsibility. An organisation like Greenpeace might represent the latter. |
20450 | The state, law, bureaucracy and capital are limitations on life, so I prefer federalist anarchism [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I begin with the ontological premise that the state is a limitation on human existence. I am against the state, law, bureaucracy, and capital. I see anarchism as the only desirable way of organising, politically. ...Its political form is federalist. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Some sympathy, but caution. All systems, even federalist anarchism, are limitations on our lives, so which limitations do we prefer? The law aspires to a calm egalitarian neutrality, which seems promising to me. |
20451 | Belief that humans are wicked leads to authoritarian politics [Critchley] |
Full Idea: If you think human beings are wicked, you turn to an authoritarian conception of politics, the Hobbesian-Machiavellian-Straussian lie. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: Right-wingers also tend to believe in free will, so they can blame and punish. Good people are more inspired by a great leader than bad people are? (Later, Critchley says authoritarians usually believe in original sin). |