11103
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We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
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Full Idea:
We must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we grew up in. We can change it bit by bit, plank by plank.
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From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 5)
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A reaction:
This is an interesting commitment to Strawson's 'revisionary' metaphysics, rather than its duller cousin 'descriptive' metaphysics. Good for Quine. Remember, though, Davidson's 'On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme'.
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11092
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A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
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Full Idea:
A river is a process through time, and the river stages are its momentary parts. Identification of the river bathed in once with the river bathed in again is just what determines our subject matter to be a river process as opposed to a river stage.
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From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1)
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A reaction:
So if we take a thing which has stages, but instead of talking about the stages we talk about a single thing that endures through them, then we are talking about a process. Sounds very good to me.
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16051
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Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
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Full Idea:
When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
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From:
Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
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A reaction:
This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!
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11093
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We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
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Full Idea:
'Red' is surely not going to be opposed to 'Cayster' [name of a river], as abstract to concrete, merely because of discontinuity in geometrical shape?
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From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 2)
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A reaction:
I've been slow to grasp the truth of this. However, Quine assumes that 'red' is concrete because 'Cayster' is, but it is perfectly arguable that 'Cayster' is an abstraction, despite all that water.
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11101
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General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
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Full Idea:
The use of general terms does not commit us to admitting a corresponding abstract entity into our ontology, but an abstract singular term, including the law of putting equals for equals, flatly commits us to an abstract entity named by the term.
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From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 4)
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A reaction:
Does this mean that in 'for the sake of the children', I have to believe in 'sakes' if I can find a synonym which will substitute for it?
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17595
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To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
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Full Idea:
The concept of identity is central in specifying spatio-temporally broad objects by ostension. Without identity, n acts of ostension merely specify up to n objects. ..But when we affirm identity of object between ostensions, they refer to the same object.
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From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1)
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A reaction:
Quine says that there is an induction involved. On the whole, Quine seems to give a better account of identity than Geach or Wiggins can offer.
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