6 ideas
2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas; that is what makes him a philosopher. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], 455) | |
A reaction: A bit surprising from the man who gave us 'language games' and 'private language argument'. |
6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: According to Wittgenstein, 'this sentence is false' sends us off on an endless, looping search for the proposition to be evaluated. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], §691) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Fogelin quotes this as one possible strategy for dealing with the Liar Paradox. It doesn't sound like much of a solution to the paradox, merely an account of why it is so annoying. Wittgenstein's challenge is that the Cretan can't state his problem. |
15391 | A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb] |
Full Idea: A substance is a basic being, something at reality's foundation. What exactly this means is a matter of some controversy. Some philosophers think of substance as an ultimate subject, something that has properties but isn't a property. | |
From: David Robb (Substance [2009], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This seems to capture the place of 'substance' in contemporary metaphysics. I think of 'substance' as a placeholder for some threatened account, even in Aristotle. |
15392 | If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb] |
Full Idea: Sometimes a whole can survive a loss of parts: the chair would still exist if it lost one of its legs. This seems to give complex objects a sort of autonomy over their parts. | |
From: David Robb (Substance [2009], 'Ident') | |
A reaction: There is then a puzzle as to how much loss of parts the whole can survive, and why. The loss of a major part could be devastating, so why do all wholes not exhibit this relation to all their parts? I demand rules, now! |
3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to the question of what we believe. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], i.437) | |
A reaction: This should have nipped the causal theory of knowledge in the bud before it got started. Everyone has a different cause for their belief that 'it sometimes rains'. Cause is not justification. |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |