Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Could There Be Unicorns?' and 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16951 It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The new discovery was that with a suitable structure imposed on the space of possible worlds, the Leibnizian idea would work for all modal logics.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16952 If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, and S is possible but doesn't obtain, then T is only possible in the world where S obtains, but T is not possible in the actual world. It follows that the relation of relative possibility is not transitive.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed]
16953 Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, T and S hold in the actual world, and S does not obtain in world v possible relative to the actual world, then the actual is not possible relative to v, since T holds in the actual. Accessibility can't be symmetrical.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
16960 If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If some world is 'a way the world might be considered to be if things were different in a certain respect', that might show that the accessibility relation should not be taken to be transitive, and we should have to adopt modal logic T.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: He has already rejected symmetry from the relation, for reasons concerning relative identity. He is torn between T and S4, but rejects S5, and opts not to discuss it.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
16958 In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
     Full Idea: In S4 logic the actual world is, in itself, special, not just from our point of view.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: S4 lacks symmetricality, so 'you can get there, but you can't get back', which makes the starting point special. So if you think the actual world has a special place in modal metaphysics, you must reject S5?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14508 A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain particular individual - not the property that we all share, of being identical with some individual, but my property of being identical with me, your property of being identical with you etc.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)
     A reaction: These philosophers tell you that a thisness 'is' so-and-so, and don't admit that he (and Plantinga) are putting forward a new theory about haecceities, and one I find implausible. I just don't believe in the property of 'being-identical-to-me'.
14511 There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: I have argued that there are possible cases in which no purely qualitative conditions would be both necessary and sufficient for possessing a given thisness.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 6)
     A reaction: Are we perhaps confusing our epistemology with our ontology here? We can ensure that something has identity, or ensure that its identity is knowable. If it is 'something', then it has identity. Er, that's it?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12031 Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Essences have normally been understood to be constituted by qualitative properties.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)
     A reaction: I add this simple point, because it might be challenged by the view that an essence is a substance, rather than the properties of anything. I prefer that, and would add that substances are individuated by distinctive causal powers.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12034 If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: There is a temporal argument for the possibility of non-identical indiscernibles, if there could be a cyclical universe, in which each event was preceded and followed by infinitely many other events qualitatively indiscernible from itself.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
     A reaction: The argument is a parallel to Max Black's indiscernible spheres in space. Adams offers the reply that time might be tightly 'curved', so that the repetition was indeed the same event again.
14510 Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Similar to the argument from spatial dispersal, we can argue against the Identity of Indiscernibles from temporal dispersal. It seems there could be a cyclic universe, ..and thus there could be distinct but indiscernible events, separated temporally.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
     A reaction: See Idea 14509 for spatial dispersal. If cosmologists decided that a cyclical universe was incoherent, would that ruin the argument? Presumably there might even be indistinguishable events in the one universe (in principle!).
16455 Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: If God creates a globe reached by travelling two diameters in a straight line from another globe, this can be described as two globes in Euclidean space, or a single globe in a tightly curved non-Euclidean space.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
     A reaction: [my compression of Adams's version of Hacking's response to Black, as spotted by Stalnaker] Hence we save the identity of indiscernibles, by saying we can't be sure that two indiscernibles are not one thing, unusually described.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16957 Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The equation of a possible world with the way that the (actual) world might be is wrong: the way a distant world might be is not a way the world might be, but a way we might allow it to be given how some intervening world might be.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: The point here is that a system of possible worlds must include relative possibilities as well as actual possibilities. Dummett argues against S5 modal logic, which makes them all equal. Things impossible here might become possible. Nice.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16959 If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If our space of possible worlds has no structure, as in the semantics for S5, then, from the standpoint of the semantics, all possible worlds are on the same footing; it then becomes difficult to resist the claim that all are equally real.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
     A reaction: This is a rather startling and interesting claim, given that modern philosophy seems full of thinkers who both espouse S5 for metaphysics, and also deny Lewisian realism about possible worlds. I'll ponder that one. Must read the new Williamson….
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14507 Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Is the world - and are all possible worlds - constituted by purely qualitative facts, or does thisness hold a place beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality?
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], Intro)
     A reaction: 'Thisness' and 'suchness' aim to capture Aristotelian notions of the entity and its attributes. Aristotle talks of 'a this'. Adams is after adding 'haecceities' to the world. My intuitive answer is no, there are no 'pure' identities. We add those.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11964 Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: According to a theory proposed by Adams, possible worlds are world-stories, that is maximally complete consistent sets of propositions which between them describe non-existent whole worlds.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979]) by George Molnar - Powers 12.2.2
     A reaction: Presumably this places an additional constraint on the view that a world is just a maximal set of propositions. It seems to require coherence as well as consistency. Suppose an object destroys all others objects. Is that a world?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16451 Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The anti-haecceitist thesis (according to Adams's version) is that all thisnesses are reducible to, or supervenient upon, suchnesses.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 3.5
11901 Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Moderate Haecceitism says that thisnesses and transworld identities are primitive, but logically connected with suchnesses. ..Extreme Haecceitism involves the rejection of all logical connections between suchness and thisness, for persons.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been
     A reaction: I am coming to the conclusion that they are not linked. That thisness is a feature of our conceptual thinking, and is utterly atomistic and content-free, while suchness is rich and a feature of reality.
14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: My position, according to which thisnesses and transworld identities are primitive but logically connected to suchnesses, we may call 'Moderate Haecceitism'.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 6)
     A reaction: The rather tentative connection to qualities is to block the possibility of Aristotle being a poached egg, which he (quite reasonably!) holds to be counterintuitive. It all feels like a mess to me.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3102 Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
12032 Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Direct reference is commonly effected by the use of proper names and indexical expressions, and sometimes by what has been called (by Donnellan) the 'referential' use of descriptions.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 2)
     A reaction: One might enquire whether the third usage should be described as 'direct', but then I am not sure that there is much of a distinction between references which are or are not 'direct'. Either you (or a sentence) refer or you (or it) don't.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
16956 To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
     Full Idea: It cannot be explained what it is for a person to be generous without first explaining what it is for an action to be generous.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 4)
     A reaction: I presume a slot machine can't be 'generous', even if it favours the punter, so you can't specify a generous action without making reference to the person. A benign circle, as Aristotle says.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
16954 Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
     Full Idea: In my view, Kripke's promotion of 'natural kinds', coverning chemical substances and animal and plant species, is unfortunate, since these are rather different types of things, and words used for them behave differently.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 2)
     A reaction: My view is that the only significant difference among natural kinds is their degree of stability in character. Presumably particles, elements and particular molecules are fairly invariant, but living things evolve.