Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Response to Slote' and 'Holism: a Shopper's Guide'

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3 ideas

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
     Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
     From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
     A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman]
     Full Idea: Virtue theory leaves out something essential, namely, the existence of a standard of behaviour which is prior to and independent of human character, in terms of which we evaluate the behaviour and character of ourselves and others.
     From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Response to Slote [1990]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §5
     A reaction: This sounds very like Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. Personally I prefer Aristotle's naturalistic reliance on human nature and function to Moore's totally unjustified intuitionist Platonism. How can anything be good if it isn't supposed to do anything?