Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Scattered Objects' and 'Anselm and Actuality'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Lewis was suspicious of boxes and diamonds as regimenting ordinary modal thought, …preferring a first-order extensional theory including possible worlds in its domain and an indexical singular term for the actual world.
     From: report of David Lewis (Anselm and Actuality [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 3.8
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: There is at the moment a pipe on my desk. Its stem has been removed but it remains a pipe for all that; otherwise no pipe could survive a thorough cleaning.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.175)
     A reaction: To say that the pipe survives dismantling is not to say that it is fully a pipe during its dismantled phase. He gives a further example of a book in two volumes.
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: If a branch falls from a tree, the tree does not thereby become scattered, and a human body does not become scattered upon loss of a bit of fingernail.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This sort of observation draws me towards essentialism. A body is scattered if you divide it in a major way, but not if you separate off a minor part. It isn't just a matter of size, or even function. We have broader idea of what is essential.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.