Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Scattered Objects' and 'Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: There is at the moment a pipe on my desk. Its stem has been removed but it remains a pipe for all that; otherwise no pipe could survive a thorough cleaning.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.175)
     A reaction: To say that the pipe survives dismantling is not to say that it is fully a pipe during its dismantled phase. He gives a further example of a book in two volumes.
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: If a branch falls from a tree, the tree does not thereby become scattered, and a human body does not become scattered upon loss of a bit of fingernail.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This sort of observation draws me towards essentialism. A body is scattered if you divide it in a major way, but not if you separate off a minor part. It isn't just a matter of size, or even function. We have broader idea of what is essential.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Quine has argued tirelessly that syntax and 'semantics' are indeterminate, and linguistic semantics of the sort that is currently in favor is a pseudoscience and a pipe dream.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory [1972]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
     A reaction: I think the defence of such things is that they may not integrate into science very well (or even integrate at all), but semantics is intended to integrate into philosophy, and is motivated by philosophical concerns. Quine may be right!