Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'On Providence' and 'Letters to Johann Bernoulli'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17)
     A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals.
Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17)
     A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18)
     A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18)
     A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca]
     Full Idea: To be always happy and to pass through life without any mental distress is to lack knowledge of one half of nature.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §4)
     A reaction: These kind of paradoxes plague virtue theory, and any theory which aims at an ideal. Heaven, for example, seems to have no problems to solve, which spells boredom. The fascination of corrupt people is their superior knowledge of the world.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Nothing bad can happen to a good man.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §2)
     A reaction: This is a pithy summary of a well know ancient attitude - one that is rejected by Aristotle, but defended by Socrates. It depends what you mean by 'bad' - but that is a rather modern response.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The waves increase by degrees, approaching to the hour and day proportionately larger or smaller in volume as they are attracted by the star we call the moon, whose power controls the ocean's surge.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §1)
     A reaction: ....just in case anyone thought that Isaac Newton had invented gravity.