Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'On Providence' and 'Truth'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
     Full Idea: We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
     A reaction: Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
     Full Idea: It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
     Full Idea: For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237)
     A reaction: The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
     Full Idea: Tarski's definition of truth is like giving a definition of what it is to win in various games, without giving a hint as to what winning is (e.g. that it is what one tries to do when playing).
     From: report of Michael Dummett (Truth [1959]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7
     A reaction: This led Dummett to his 'normative' account of truth. Formally, the fact that speakers usually aim at truth seems irrelevant, but in life you certainly wouldn't have grasped truth if you thought falsehood was just as satisfactory. The world is involved.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]
     Full Idea: One could train a dog to bark only when a bell rang and a light shone without presupposing that it possessed the concept of conjunction.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.235)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca]
     Full Idea: To be always happy and to pass through life without any mental distress is to lack knowledge of one half of nature.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §4)
     A reaction: These kind of paradoxes plague virtue theory, and any theory which aims at an ideal. Heaven, for example, seems to have no problems to solve, which spells boredom. The fascination of corrupt people is their superior knowledge of the world.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Nothing bad can happen to a good man.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §2)
     A reaction: This is a pithy summary of a well know ancient attitude - one that is rejected by Aristotle, but defended by Socrates. It depends what you mean by 'bad' - but that is a rather modern response.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The waves increase by degrees, approaching to the hour and day proportionately larger or smaller in volume as they are attracted by the star we call the moon, whose power controls the ocean's surge.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §1)
     A reaction: ....just in case anyone thought that Isaac Newton had invented gravity.