4 ideas
8460 | Philosophers have given precise senses to deduction, probability, computability etc [Quine/Ullian] |
Full Idea: Successful explications (giving a precise sense to a term) have been found for the concepts of deduction, probability and computability, to name just three. | |
From: W Quine / J Ullian (The Web of Belief [1970], 65), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Quine also cites the concept of an 'ordered pair'. Orenstein adds Tarski's definition of truth, Russell's definite descriptions, and the explication of existence in terms of quantifications. Cf. Idea 2958. |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The idea that there should be something like a distinction of levels among properties is captured in Ramsey's 'simple theory of types'. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell | |
A reaction: I merely report this, though it is not immediately obvious how anyone would decide which 'level' a type belonged on. |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are maps by which we steer. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.259 n5 |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |