16045
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General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
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Full Idea:
Russell noted that you cannot arrive at general facts by inference from numerous particular facts, ..but general facts logically supervene on particular ones. So the general facts supervene, but are not entailed.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Karen Bennett - Supervenience §3.2
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A reaction:
The belief that the general facts supervene on the particular ones then seems to be more a matter of faith than of fact. Or maybe it is analytic, depending on what we understand by 'general'. Universal, or generalised?
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20420
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The emotion expressed is non-conscious, but feels oppressive until expression relieves it [Collingwood]
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Full Idea:
The emotion expressed is one of whose nature the person feeling it is no longer conscious. As unexpressed, he feels it in a helpless and oppressed way; as expressed, the oppression has vanished. His mind is somehow lightened and eased.
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From:
R.G. Collingwood (The Principles of Art [1938], p.110), quoted by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood 1
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A reaction:
It sounds like the regular smoking of cigarettes. This is Collingwood answer the doubts I felt about Idea 20419. I would have thought the desire of Picasso was to create another painting, but not to express yet another new oppressive feeling.
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20421
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Art exists ideally, purely as experiences in the mind of the perceiver [Collingwood, by Kemp]
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Full Idea:
For Collingwood (and Croce) the work of art is an ideal object; …they are things that exist only in the mind, that is, only when one perceives. …The physical work exists to make this experience available.
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From:
report of R.G. Collingwood (The Principles of Art [1938]) by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood 2
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A reaction:
This means that the paintings in a gallery cease to be works of art when the gallery is shut, which sounds odd. I suppose 'work of art' is ambiguous, between the experience (right) and the facilitator of the experience (wrong).
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