3 ideas
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The truth condition of the belief is the 'normal' circumstances in which, given the learning process, it is biologically supposed to be present. | |
From: David Papineau (Reality and Representation [1987], p.67), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2 | |
A reaction: How do we account for a belief in ghosts in this story? The notion of 'normal' circumstances and what is 'biologically supposed' to happen don't seem very appropriate. This is the 'teleological' view of belief. |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
7294 | No crime and no punishment without a law [Roman law] |
Full Idea: An ancient principle of Roman law states, nullum crimen et nulla poene sine lege, - there is no crime and no punishment without a law. | |
From: [Roman law] (Roman Law [c.100]), quoted by A.C. Grayling - Among the Dead Cities Ch.6 | |
A reaction: That there is no 'punishment' without law seems the basis of civilization. Suppose a strong person imposed firm punishment in order to forestall more brutal revenge by others? What motivates the creation of criminal laws? |