37 ideas
12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: x bears to y the 'ancestral' of the relation R just if either x bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to some z that bears R to y, or..... | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1) | |
A reaction: A concept invented by Frege (1879). |
12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Substances are things that have a source of change or principle of activity within them. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: A vey significant concession. I think we can talk of 'essences' and 'powers', and drop talk of 'substances'. 'Powers' is a much better word, because it immediately pushes the active ingredient to the forefront. |
12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What is singled out is never a bare this or that, but this or that something or other. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: I like, in ontological speculation, to contemplate the problem of the baffling archaeological find. 'This thing I have dug up - what the hell IS it?'. Wiggins is contemptuous of the term 'thisness', and the idea of bare particulars. |
12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Predications which answer the question 'what is x?' are often called 'sortal predications' in present-day philosophy. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1) | |
A reaction: The word 'sortal' comes from Locke. Wiggins is the guru of 'sortal essentialism'. I just can't believe that in answer to the question 'what really is David Wiggins?' that he would be happy with a sequence of categorisations. |
12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: To say that the river is changing constantly in every respect is not to say that it is changing in respect of being a river. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.11.2) | |
A reaction: Can't a river become a lake, or a mere stream? Wiggins's proposal does not help with the problem of a river which sometimes dries up (as my local river sometimes does). At what point do we decide it is no longer a river? |
12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The sense of the sortal term under which we pick out an individual expands into the scientific account of things of that kind, where the account clarifies what is at issue in questions of sameness and difference of specimens of that kind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.1) | |
A reaction: This is how the sortal approach is supposed to deal with individuals. So the placid tiger reveals much by falling under 'tiger', and a crucial extra bit by falling under 'placid'. See Idea 12053 for problems with this proposal. |
12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Substance are what the world is articulated into when the segments of kinds corresponds to the real divisions in reality. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: This is very helpful in clarifying Wiggins's very obscurely expressed views. He appears to be saying that if we divide the sheep from the goats correctly, we reveal sheep-substance and goat-substance (one substance per species). Crazy! |
12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: One person can be more or less of a poet than another, so 'poet' is not a conclusory answer to the question 'What is it that is singled out here?' 'Poet' rides on the back of the answer 'human being'. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: So apparently one must assign a natural kind, and not just a class. Wiggins lacks science fiction imagination. In the genetic salad of the far future, being a poet may be more definitive than being a human being. See Idea 12063. |
12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A system of secondary substances with a claim to separate reality into its genuine primary substances must arise from an understanding of a set of principles of activity on the basis of which identities can be glossed in terms of determinate relations. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: I translate this as saying that individual essences are categorised according to principles which explain behaviour and relations. I'm increasingly bewildered by the 'secondary substances' Wiggins got from 'Categories', and loves so much. |
12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A substance is a persisting and somehow basic object of reference that is there to be discovered in perception and thought, an object whose claim to be recognized as a real entity is a claim on our aspirations to understand the world. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.1) | |
A reaction: A lot of components are assigned by Wiggins to the concept, and the tricky job, inititiated by Aristotle, is to fit all the pieces together nicely. Personally I am wondering if the acceptance of 'essences' implies dropping 'substances'. |
12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Matter ex hypothesi is what ultimately underlies (to huperkeimenon) a thing; it is that from which something comes to be and which remains as a non-coincidental component in the thing's make-up. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 192a30) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting prelude to the much more comprehensive discussion of matter in Metaphysics, where he crucially adds the notion of 'form', and gives it priority over the underlying matter. |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: For us the importance of the category of substance, if it has any importance, is not so much ontological as relative to our epistemological circumstances and the conditions under which we have to undertake inquiry. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant concession. Wiggins has revived the notion of substance in recent times, but he is not quite adding it to the furniture of the world. Personally I increasingly think we can dump it, in ontology and epistemology. |
12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Answering 'what is it?' with the secondary substance identifies an object with a class of continuants which survive certain changes, come into being in certain ways, are qualified in certain ways, behave in certain ways, and cease to be in certain ways. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.3.3) | |
A reaction: Thus the priority of this sort of answer is that a huge range of explanations immediately flow from it. I take the explanation to be prior, and the primary substance to be prior, since secondary substance is inductively derived from it. |
12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It seems mandatory to an observer of soldiers to give 'the final touch of unity' to their aggregate entity (the army). ...Similar claims arise with the ontological and explanatory claims of other corporate entities. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.3) | |
A reaction: Wiggins must say (following Leibniz Essays II.xxiv,1) that we add the unity, but I take the view that an army has powers, and hence offers explanations, which are lacking in a merely group of disparate soldiers. So an army has an essence and identity. |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. …One set of private interests would check another set of private interests. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who think a completely free market will evolve into a flourishing and just society. There is a basic debate about the importance of the character of the citizens in any polity. Marxists say they are entangled. |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Galston says responsible citizenship requires four types of civic virtue: general (law-abiding, loyal), social (independent, open-minded), economic (diligent, restrained, adaptable), and political (respect, sensible, judgement, engagement). | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: [Galston's 'Liberal Purposes' 1991] (compressed) This immediately seems to be asking too much, especially for those who know little, or are short of money. |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: To defend Aristotelian republicanism it is not enough to show that individual require society - liberals do not deny this. They must also show that individuals need to be politically active. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. People are not just inactive because they have been rendered powerless. In any group of people there are some who are keen to have a voice, or lead, and others who are largely happy to follow. |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Minimal citizenship is often seen as simply requiring non-interference with others, but that ignores a basic requirement of liberal citizenship, which is the social virtue of 'civility' or 'decency'. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: He makes the point that the minimal requirement has to be given up when there is a crisis, which needs much more involvement. This largely describes modern Britain, prior to the Brexit rift. |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society …involves a radical extension of the obligations of liberal citizenship. The obligation to treat people as equal citizens now applies to everyday decisions. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: This is very difficult for an older generation who felt their 'entitlement' as leading citizens, or who routinely favoured their local traditional community. But they just have to 'get over it'! |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: According to the New Right, to promote active citizenship-for-all or entitlements, we must focus instead on people's responsibility to earn a living. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Every creature has to earn a living, but one method is to successfully sponge off others. A cushy job is a sort of sponging. An excessively well paid job is a sort of sponging. Citizenship must involve responsibilities of some sort. |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Modern discussion has shifted from 'vote-centric' (or 'aggregative') to 'talk-centric' democracy. The vote-centric model has no mechanism for developing a consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an honourable compromise. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that a person's preferences betweent these two is a reflection of character, or basic attitudes to morality. Some people think democratically about their relationships, and others very obviously don't. |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: A liberal-democratic system is one in which those people who are subject to political authority have a right to participate in determining that authority. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
A reaction: This applies to immigrants. The most anti-democratic move in recent democracies is the strategy of trying to make it more difficult to vote, perhaps by demanding identification documents, or creating huge queues. |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Our attachment to private life, I believe, is the result not (or not only) of the impoverishment of public life, but the enrichment of private life. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Perhaps a sentiment expected more from a university lecturer than from a poorly-paid labourer. Does he mean watching innumerable TV shows instead of having sing-songs in the local pub? Increased leisure is indisputable. |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of an official religion, so too there cannot be official cultures that have preferred status. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This becomes tricky in schools, where the old way of teaching national literature and particular types of music has been eroded in modern times. But once wide diversity is allowed there is no single story which can be taught. |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberals need to replace the idea of 'benign neglect', and recognise the central role of nation-building in a democracy. …This means promoting a common language, and equal access to institutions operating in that language. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
A reaction: 'Benign neglect' is non-interference with citizens' lives. Obviously the institutions include education, but is a state health service implied? Can equal access by guaranteed to private institutions? |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: On the view of 'differentiated citizenship', members of certain groups would be incorporated into the community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights would depend in part on their group membership. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: This is obviously a strategy to enable marginalised individuals to be fully included in society. The downside is that individuals gain their social identity through a label, rather than through themselves, which pure liberals dislike. 'Identity politics'. |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The evidence suggests that (contrary to the Marxist view) the status hierarchy is not reducible to the economic hierarchy. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka is particularly thinking of racism, which lowers the status of certain groups, even if they are economically successful. I console myself for my modest economic status by getting lots of education. |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Defending multiculturalism initially involved endorsing the communitarian critique of liberalism, and viewed minority rights as defending cohesive minority groups against the encroachment of liberal individualism. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.1) | |
A reaction: Liberal individualists have to accept these criticisms from Marxists, communitarians and multiculturalists. The lone individual has no group that guarantees support, and individuals (especially the young) can easily sink. |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The 'liberal culturalist' position is that minorities which share basic liberal principles nonetheless need minority rights. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Disabled liberals are an obvious example. This strikes me as a promising version of liberalism, which accepts the criticisms of extreme individualism. |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Many feminists express concern that multiculturalism in practice typically means giving male members of the group the power to control the women in the group. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: The way the young are treated might also be a problem. The underlying question is whether the minority group is more or less civilised than the central state. Liberalism always fights for the rights of the least powerful. |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberal defenders of multiculturalism must distinguish 'bad' minority rights which are restrictions from 'good' minority rights which supplement individual rights. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably no sensible liberal wants to remove all restrictions, so deeper values must be invoked to justify the mode of approved minority rights. A list of human goods seems needed. |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Why should national minorities not have the same powers of nation-building as the majority? | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
A reaction: A 'national minority' is marked by a different language, or a different religion, or both. No one doubts the majority's right to nation-build. Some further principle would be needed to deny that right to a minority. Maybe the minority was there first? |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberal multiculturalism challenges status inequalities while preserving individual freedom. …Conservative multiculturalism replaces liberal principles with a communitarian politics of the common good, at least at the local or group level. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sounds a bit simplistic. Recent emphasis on 'the common good', in the face of white supremacists etc., seems admirable, but surely challenging inequalities promotes the common good? Minority cultures are often conservative. |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka explains a lot of politics and society in terms of the desire of governments to 'build' their nation. You have to make people who are essentially powerless feel that they are at least in some way involved, and benefiting. |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: [from John Porter 1987] Does this imply that you might have rights as part of a group which you don't have as a state citizen? Positive discrimination, for example. Differential rights sounds like potential trouble. |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The development of the welfare state has been quite successful in integrating the working classes into national cultures throughout the Western democracies. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Hard-line capitalists tend to hate the welfare state, as unfair to high earners, but it not only makes workers feel involved, but also provides a healthier, happier, more knowledgeable work force for employers. |