14 ideas
19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151) | |
A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom. |
13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
Full Idea: If any man shall take the words number and sum in a larger sense, to understand things which are numberless and sumless (such as the infinite points on a line), I could allow him the contradictious phrase 'innumerable number' without absurdity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I take the key point here to be the phrase of taking number 'in a larger sense'. Like the word 'atom' in physics, the word 'number' retains its traditional reference, but has considerably shifted its scope. Amateurs must live with this. |
13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
Full Idea: It is an error that all infinites are equal. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17) | |
A reaction: There follows a discussion of the mathematicians' view of infinity. Cantor was not the first to notice that there is more than one sort of of infinity. |
7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God. |
19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'? |
19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do. |
5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139) | |
A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'. |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill. |
19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral. |
15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
Full Idea: When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a deity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10) | |
A reaction: Harré quotes this, and it shows that the rather passive view of nature Newton developed was to be supplemented by the active power of God. Without God, we need a more active view of nature. |
8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
Full Idea: You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent in matter. Pray do no ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17) | |
A reaction: I take science to be a two-stage operation - first we discern the regularities, and then we explain them. Evolution was spotted, then explained by Darwin. Cancer from cigarettes was spotted, but hasn't been explained. Regularity is the beginning. |
13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
Full Idea: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10) | |
A reaction: He is writing to a cleric, but seems to be quite sincere about this. Elsewhere he just says he doesn't know what causes gravity. |
12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
Full Idea: That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter ...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25) | |
A reaction: He is replying to some sermons, and he pays vague lip service to a possible divine force. Nevertheless, this is thoroughgoing anti-essentialism, and he talks of external 'laws' in the next sentence. Newton still sought the cause of gravity. |