5 ideas
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
| From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
| 3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §152), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: A nice metaphor for the way in which axioms are derived. It is also close to Quine's metaphor of the 'net' of understanding, with the centre area 'standing fast'. Not neat and tidy, though. |
| 3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein remarked that if you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14 |
| 14470 | Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another. |
| 4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §114) | |
| A reaction: A wonderfully challenging aphorism. I suspect that it is true, but not really a problem. We all know the meaning of 'Loch Ness Monster', as long as we don't get too fussy. And for local objects I am happy that I know the facts. |