7 ideas
| 22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23) | |
| A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action. |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
| From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
| 22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33) | |
| A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view. |
| 22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it? | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35) | |
| A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well. |
| 7346 | Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Jeremiah was the first to perceive the possibility that powerlessness and goodness were somehow linked; ...he comes close to the notion that the state itself was inherently evil. | |
| From: report of Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
| A reaction: This looks like the first seeds of the anarchist idea. You abandon the state for something 'higher'. 'Perceive' rather begs the question of whether he is right. This is the full 'inversion of values' of Nietzsche. |
| 22920 | Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah] |
| Full Idea: Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth? | |
| From: Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE], 23:24), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 03 'Where' | |
| A reaction: If the Lord is omnipresent, then He must be present in each one of us. But does the Lord interact with each of us? |
| 22089 | Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah] |
| Full Idea: Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? Do I not fill heaven and earth? | |
| From: Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE], 23:23), quoted by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 3 | |
| A reaction: I assume this was often quoted by eighteenth century divines, against the rise of deism. |