Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Quine on Quantifying In' and 'The Status of Content'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth

6345	Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
	Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory.
	From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8
	A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

12220	Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Do we attribute a logical form to a sentence token because it is a token of a type with that form, or do we attribute a logical form to a sentence type because it is a type of a token with that form?
	From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.110)
	A reaction: Since I believe in propositions (as the unambiguous thought that lies behind a sentence), I take it that logical form concerns propositions, though strict logicians don't like this, for fear that logic spills into psychology.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

12222	Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Substitutional quantification may be regarded as referential quantification over expressions.
	From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.124)
	A reaction: This is an illuminating gloss. Does such quantification involve some ontological commitment to expressions? I feel an infinite regress looming.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7628	Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
	Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
	A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.