Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Quine on Quantifying In' and 'Reply to Fourth Objections'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
12220 Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Do we attribute a logical form to a sentence token because it is a token of a type with that form, or do we attribute a logical form to a sentence type because it is a type of a token with that form?
     From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.110)
     A reaction: Since I believe in propositions (as the unambiguous thought that lies behind a sentence), I take it that logical form concerns propositions, though strict logicians don't like this, for fear that logic spills into psychology.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
12222 Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Substitutional quantification may be regarded as referential quantification over expressions.
     From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.124)
     A reaction: This is an illuminating gloss. Does such quantification involve some ontological commitment to expressions? I feel an infinite regress looming.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
     Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
3643 The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
     A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.