Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Basic Problems of Phenomenology' and 'Manuscript remains'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: No one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophizes is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], II p.241-3), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is a direct reply to the opposite view expressed by Schleiermacher (and quoted by Lewis). I would say that to be a philosopher one must give priority to the philosophy, ahead of any religious beliefs. Thinking must be free.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of an atemporal realm of validity is an invention that is no less doubtful than medieval speculation about angels.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Basic Problems of Phenomenology [1927], p.215), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 2 'Theory'
     A reaction: This seems to be flatly opposed to the view of Frege, and shows why continental philosophy has largely eschewed a study of logic. It is hard for a philosopher to pursue logic extensively without commitment to the Fregean Third Realm.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
     Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: As the subject of willing I am an exceedingly wretched being, and all our suffering consistd in willing, ...but as soon as I am absorbed in knowledge, I am blissfully happy and nothing can assail me.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.137), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: So the source of his pessimism is subjection to his own will. However, since becoming absorbed in knowledge is an easy task for a scholar, he has little to grumble about. Nietzsche mocked the great pessimist for playing the flute every day.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: To deduce from reason [Vernunft] the moral element in conduct is blasphemy. In this element there is expressed the better consciousness which lies far above all reason. expresses itself in conduct as holiness, and is the true salvation of the world.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.47), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: Aimed at Kant. Only Plato could inspire a non-religious person to write about morality is such terms. Maybe also the stoic ideal of beautiful deeds (given the supreme value Schopenhauer placed on the arts).
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Basic Problems of Phenomenology [1927], p.278), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§39-42
     A reaction: I take it as significant that this is what it 'has' chosen, and not what it now 'chooses'. I might accept that my mode of existence results from past choices, but certainly not that I can choose it now. Ossified brain.